A Survey of Top-Level Ontologies - to inform the ontological choices for a Foundation Data Model by Partridge, Chris et al.
A survey of Top-Level 
Ontologies
To inform the ontological choices for a  
Foundation Data Model
A survey of Top-Level Ontologies A survey of Top-Level Ontologies2 3
Contents
1  Introduction and Purpose 4
2  Approach and contents 5
2.1   Collect candidate top-level ontologies 5
2.2  Develop assessment framework 6
2.3  Assessment of candidate top-level ontologies against 
the framework 6
2.4 Terminological note 7
3  Assessment framework – development basis 8
3.1  General ontological requirements 8
3.2  Overarching ontological architecture framework 10
4  Ontological commitment overview 13
4.1   General choices 13
4.2   Formal structure –  
horizontal and vertical 16
4.3 Universal commitments 35
5  Assessment Framework Results 40
5.1   General choices 40
5.2   Formal structure: vertical aspects 42
5.3   Formal structure: horizontal aspects 46
5.4   Universal commitments 48
6 Summary 50
Appendix A 
Pathway requirements for a Foundation Data Model 53
Appendix B 
ISO IEC 21838-1:2019 – Documenting Coverage 56
Appendix C 
Coverage Mapping to Assessment Framework 60
Appendix D 
Candidate source top-level ontologies – longlist 63
Appendix E 
Selected candidate source top-level ontologies – details 66
E.1  Introduction 66




E.6  ConML + CHARM – Conceptual Modelling Language 
and Cultural Heritage Abstract Reference Model 79
E.7 COSMO – COmmon Semantic MOdel 81
E.8 Cyc 82
E.9 DC – Dublin Core 83
E.10 DOLCE – Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and 
Cognitive Engineering 86
E.11 EMMO 87
E.12  FIBO – Financial Industry Business Ontology 89
E.13 FrameNet 90
E.14 GFO – General Formal Ontology 91
E.15 gist 93
E.16  HQDM – High Quality Data Models 95
E.17  IDEAS – International Defence Enterprise  
Architecture Specification 97
E.18 IEC 62541 98
E.19 IEC 63088 98
E.20 ISO 12006-3 99
E.21 ISO 15926-2 100
E.22 KKO: KBpedia Knowledge Ontology 101
E.23 KR Ontology – Knowledge Representation Ontology 103
E.24 MarineTLO: A Top-Level  
Ontology for the Marine Domain 104
E.25  MIMOSA CCOM –  
(Common Conceptual Object Model) 106
E.26 OWL – Web Ontology Language 108









E.36 UMLS – Unified Medical Language System 123
E.37 WordNet 124
E.38 YAMATO – Yet Another More Advanced Top-level 
Ontology 125
Appendix F 
Prior ontological commitment literature 127
Appendix G 
Criteria for a good scientific theory 128
Appendix H 
Detailed notes on 3.2.1 Basis 129
H.1 Simplicity 129
H.2 Explanatory sufficiency 129
Appendix I 
Ontological commitments – technical details 131
I.1  Natural language ontology – foundational ontology 131






A survey of Top-Level Ontologies A survey of Top-Level Ontologies4 5
1  Introduction and Purpose
The Centre for Digital Built Britain has been 
tasked through the Digital Framework 
Task Group to develop an Information 
Management Framework (IMF) to support 
the development of a National Digital 
Twin (NDT) as set out in “The Pathway to 
an Information Management Framework” 
(Hetherington, 2020). A key component of 
the IMF is a Foundation Data Model (FDM), 
built upon a top-level ontology (TLO), as a 
basis for ensuring consistent data across 
the NDT.
This document captures the results 
collected from a broad survey of top-level 
ontologies, conducted by the IMF technical 
team. It focuses on the core ontological 
choices made in their foundations and 
the pragmatic engineering consequences 
these have on how the ontologies can be 
applied and further scaled. This document 
will provide the basis for discussions 
on a suitable TLO for the FDM. It is also 
expected that these top-level ontologies 
will provide a resource whose components 
can be harvested and adapted for inclusion 
in the FDM.
Following the publication of this document, 
the programme will perform a structured 
assessment of the TLOs identified herein, 
with a view to selecting one or more TLOs 
that will form the kernel around which the 
FDM will evolve. A further report – The 
FDM TLO Selection Paper – will be issued 
to describe this process in late 2020.
2  Approach and contents
The approach has three parts:
1.  collect candidate top-level 
ontologies (2.1)
2.  develop assessment framework 
(2.2)
3.  assess candidate top-level 
ontologies against the framework 
(2.3)
These are described in more detail 
below.
A note on the terminology used in 
the report is contained in 2.4 and 
Appendix J.
2.1   Collect candidate top-level 
ontologies
A long list of possible candidates for 
TLO content that might be useful for the 
construction of the FDM has been drawn 
up and reviewed.
Candidate ontologies were identified 
both through extensive desktop research, 
and through the experience and domain 
knowledge of the expert community 
involved in bringing this report together.
In identifying candidates, the net was 
thrown as wide as possible to identify 
as much useful content as possible. 
Thus, though the focus is on ontological 
commitment, the list includes data models 
that are generic in nature (ones without an 
explicit ontological foundation) as these 
are likely to have some useful ontological 
content. The candidates are listed in 
Appendix D and are available online within 
the IMF Developers Network on the Digital 
Twin Hub, www.digitaltwinhub.co.uk.
The pathway towards an 
Information Management 
Framework
A ‘Commons’ for Digital Built Britain
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2.2  Develop assessment 
framework
In compiling this report, a first-pass 
assessment framework was developed 
to facilitate the initial testing of the 
spectrum of available TLOs and other 
ontological models against the needs of 
the programme. This assessment is distinct 
from the future activities around the further 
down-selection of TLOs to a selected core 
for the FDM.
An ontology is (according to Jonathon 
Lowe in The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy) “the set of things whose 
existence is acknowledged by a particular 
theory or system of thought.” When we 
interpret a dataset, working out what the 
data refers to, we are acknowledging 
that the dataset commits to these things 
existing. We are committing to an ontology 
– making an ontological commitment.
There are a variety of ways of making these 
commitments. The purpose of a top-level 
ontology is to enable us to make the choice 
of ontological commitments in an explicit 
and consistent way.
There have been a series of attempts to 
get to grips with the kinds of choices of 
ontological commitments that ontologies 
can make. They provide a reasonable 
starting point but need substantial 
further work to provide a comprehensive 
framework for making choices across a 
broad range of commitments. We have 
developed a comprehensive choice 
component for this framework; one that is 
suitable for assessing information system 
TLOs.
With this choice component in place, we 
can look at how these choices shape an 
ontology’s underlying architecture and so 
what it can do and how it does it. We can 
also characterise the candidate TLOs in 
terms of whether they make a choice and 
which they choose.
The assessment framework has three 
levels.
1.  A general level, which looks at 
whether the TLO makes an ontological 
commitment and the strength of this 
commitment (see 4.1).
2.  A formal level, which looks at how 
the formal structure of the TLO has 
been impacted by its ontological 
commitment (see 4.2).
3.  A universal level, which looks at how 
the TLO addresses the individual 
universal choices (see 4.3).
Further details on the basis for the 
assessment process are described in 
Section 4.
2.3  Assessment of candidate top-
level ontologies against the 
framework
The assessment framework described 
above has been applied to the candidate 
TLOs. Only a small number of TLOs made 
their ontological commitments explicit, 
enabling a clear, simple assessment. In 
other cases, the choices could be clearly 
inferred from the documentation available. 
However, in many cases we could not 
determine the choice.
It could be that no choice was intended, 
or that the choice is not documented, or 
not documented sufficiently clearly in the 
material we have reviewed or some other 
reason. Rather than trying to classify the 
exact reason for each case, where we have 
not noted a choice, we have marked the 
cell ‘not assessed’. In some cases, typically 
ISO standards, the documentation is not 
publicly available, so to make this clear 
we have marked these ‘not available’. The 
results of the assessment are stored online 
within the IMF Developers Network on the 
Digital Twin Hub, www.digitaltwinhub.co.uk. 
with a summary provided in section 6.
In addition, a brief overview of the 
candidate top-level ontologies with any 
useful additional points is given in Appendix 
E. These include a graphical representation 
of the TLOs where one has been found. A 
comparison shows clearly the diversity of 
top-level structures.
2.4 Terminological note
This is a topic that crosses multiple 
disciplines, including information 
systems, computer science, philosophy 
and linguistics. Confusingly, many terms 
are used with different senses across 
these disciplines and even within them. 
Accordingly, we will attempt, where 
possible, to use terms with the senses 
that they have in the disciplines in which 
they arise – to minimise any increase in the 
confusion and encourage cross-disciplinary 
consistency.
There is one critical case where there is 
little consistency, this is a term for objects 
in general. These are sometimes also 
known as entities or things – through 
all three of these terms have restricted 
senses in various sub-disciplines. We 
propose to use the term ‘object’ here, 
rather than ‘entities’ or ‘things’ unless the 
context requires it as this is the term most 
consistently used in philosophy, and can 
be found with this sense as far back as the 
17th century (Locke, 1975). Where needed 
we will qualify the term – for example, 
material objects. If we are using the term in 
a different sense, we will clearly note this. 
Of course, all three terms will appear in the 
extracts from the TLO documentation.
Other terms are defined in the glossary in 
Appendix J.
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3  Assessment framework – 
development basis
The development of the assessment 
framework is driven by two broad 
considerations:
 general ontological requirements (3.1); 
and
 the requirement for an overarching 
ontological architecture (3.2)
These are described below.
3.1  General ontological 
requirements
The general requirements provide a context 
for the framework and comprise:
1.  the need for an ontological framework 
(3.1.1);
2.  how the need for an ontological 
framework translates into making 
choices of ontological commitments 
(3.1.2 and 3.1.3);
3.  the requirements that arise from the 
lack of prior knowledge (3.1.4); and
4.  the need for consistent independent 
(federated) development (3.1.5).
3.1.1  Real world ontology framework
If one wants to share data from different 
systems, then one needs to have 
something like a common framework within 
which to share it. When the data is in this 
common framework, its meaning needs to 
be clear and unambiguous to the systems 
sharing it. This is often called semantic 
interoperability. For example, it needs to 
be clear and unambiguous whether data 
items (for example, rows on a table) from 
two systems are referring to the same 
object or different objects in the ‘real 
world’ – for example the UNICLASS Code 
‘Ac_05_50_91 – Timber sourcing’ is marked 
as mapping to NBS Code ‘45-60-90/340 
– Timber procurement’. To implement this 
systematically, one needs to be clear and 
unambiguous about what these objects in 
the real world are. This involves knowing 
the ontology, in other words, knowing the 
set of objects that the common framework 
assumes exist.
3.1.2  Choices of ontological 
commitments
Unfortunately, when one starts to look 
closely, it is neither clear nor unambiguous 
exactly what the objects in the real world 
are. Ontologically, there are a variety of 
ways that one can take the real world to 
be. However, for our assessment, these 
can be crystallised into a small number 
of focussed choices – called ontological 
commitments – which build up into an 
integrated ontological architecture.
A key purpose of this paper is to provide 
a framework for understanding the range 
and nature of the ontological commitments 
and apply this to the collected top-level 
ontologies. Thus, providing the groundwork 
for the choice of an appropriate ontological 
architecture.
3.1.3  Implicit and explicit choices
Understandably, most of the datasets 
currently available are not clear about 
their ontological architecture, which of 
these ontological commitments have been 
made – their choices, such as they are, are 
implicit. In practice, datasets often make 
these choices implicitly – choosing, without 
realising, one way in one area and another 
way in another area. This point is often 
made in philosophy textbooks,  see, for 
example, (Lowe, 1998).
The assessment framework gives a clear 
picture of the range of these choices. With 
this in hand, when selecting or developing 
a top-level ontology, one can be clear 
which choices are made (and which left 
to chance); and so have some idea how 
this will be, in turn, reflected in the data 
structures and data that are implemented.
3.1.4  Lack of prior knowledge
Usually the developers of a system of 
systems (which will include behavioural, 
societal and human elements) have prior 
knowledge of some of the systems that 
will use the common framework. However, 
often other requirements will arise as 
new systems are added to the common 
framework – of which it will have no 
prior knowledge. Hence, the framework 
needs to be sufficiently expressive to 
accommodate them. More specifically, care 
needs to be taken not to adopt ontological 
commitments which unnecessarily restrict 
its ability to express meanings that 
probably will occur in data from new source 
systems. For example, the commitment 
choices include whether to restrict the 
types to first order (where types cannot 
have types as instances). One cannot just 
assume that as the current data set only 
has first order types, then one can restrict 
oneself to these – one also needs some 
confidence that a requirement for higher 
order types will not emerge in the future. 
In this case, there is then a requirement to 
be sensitive to how a choice of ontological 
commitment might restrict useful 
expressivity.
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3.1.5  Consistent independent 
(federated) development
Many systems for connecting systems, like 
the NDT, have a hub and spoke structure 
where spoke systems map their data into 
the central hub system. It is likely that 
these mappings will be done independently. 
In many cases, the content from different 
systems will overlap. Where this happens, 
the mappings produced should be 
equivalent. Adopting an ontological 
approach is a big step towards achieving 
this because it provides an independent 
basis for establishing identity between 
the systems. Fine tuning the choice of 
ontological commitments to ensure a clear 
notion of what is referred to is a good 
further step. In this case, there is then a 
requirement to be sensitive to how a choice 
of ontological commitment can be clearer 
about what is referred to and so give rise to 
equivalent independent mappings.
3.2  Overarching ontological 
architecture framework
As mentioned earlier, there have been 
several attempts to get to grips with 
the kinds of choices of ontological 
commitments that TLOs should make; 
these are listed in Appendix F. These 
attempts provide a good starting point 
and we refer to them when this is useful, 
usually in the technical appendices. 
However, all these lists are partial and, in 
some cases, not based upon sufficient 
familiarity with the relevant research. 
Furthermore, none of them provide an 
over-arching organising structure; one that 
provides a framework for understanding 
and assessing choices across a range of 
commitments. We develop this framework 
in 3.2.1 below.
3.2.1  Basis
There needs to be a clear and solid 
underlying basis for the framework. 
There is an established set of criteria for 
assessing what a good ontology is, based 
upon what makes a good scientific theory 
– listed in Appendix G. One of these criteria, 
simplicity, provides us with a good basis 
for a broad assessment of the architecture 
and is broadly outlined below, with more 
technical detail in Appendix H.
Simplicity can be thought of as having two 
aspects; structural and ontological. Where 
structural or syntactic simplicity is roughly 
concerned with the shape of the organising 
structure, ontological simplicity is roughly 
concerned with the number of objects.
For structural (syntactic) simplicity we look 
at the characteristic ways the ontological 
commitments shape the organising 
structure (see section 4). For ontological 
simplicity we do some more analysis to 
establish broad brush accounting principles 
(as set out in 3.2.1.1 in 3.2.1.3 below).
3.2.1.1  Accounting for ontological simplicity
Ontological simplicity is usually associated 
with a number of characteristics including 
parsimony, explanatory sufficiency 
and fruitfulness. Parsimony is usually 
characterised as Ockham’s Razor – 
objects are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity. There is less well-known, but 
with an equally long history, principle of 
explanatory sufficiency – “the variety of 
entities should not be rashly diminished” 
(Kant, 1964). Parsimony and explanatory 
sufficiency, taken together, imply a kind 
of ontological economy, which aims for 
explanatory sufficiency with the minimum 
number of entities. We look at how to 
account for this first and then return to 
fruitfulness (see 3.2.1.3).
Simple counting of objects does not seem 
intuitively correct way of accounting. If 
Ann claims that the damage to my carrot 
patch was caused by exactly 100 rabbits, 
and Ben claims it was done by 101 rabbits, 
then it is hard to feel that Ben’s theory is 
any way less economical than Ann’s, or that 
Ben has multiplied entities in a way that 
calls for concern. If Ann now claims the 
damage to my carrot patch was caused 
by 5 rabbits (one type and five individuals) 
and Ben claims it was caused by 1 deer and 
3 rabbits (two types and four individuals) 
– then despite both claims involving six 
objects, Ben’s seems more complex. In the 
literature, this is seen as arising from a 
distinction between qualitative parsimony 
(roughly, the number of types of object) 
and quantitative parsimony (roughly, the 
number of individual objects). In the 
research, most people claim qualitative 
parsimony matters and quantitative 
parsimony is less relevant – making a 
distinction between the making of the 
commitment and its cost. If Ann now 
claims the damage was caused by 12 
rabbits (one type and 12 individuals) and 
Ben claims it was caused by 1 deer and 3 
rabbits (two types and four individuals), 
then Ann’s claim is more qualitatively 
parsimonious (one versus two types) but 
less quantitatively parsimonious (twelve 
versus four individuals) than Ben’s. The 
suggestion is that Ann’s claim is more 
relevantly economic than Ben’s.
The claim that qualitative parsimony 
matters more than quantitative parsimony 
resonates for the design and maintenance 
information systems. For example, function 
or object point analysis (e.g. FiSMA: ISO/
IEC 29881 or IFPUG: ISO/IEC 20926:2009) 
measures are based upon qualitative 
(type) rather than quantitative (individual) 
counts. However, as has been noted, this 
qualitative-quantitative distinction seems 
too simplistic – for example, not taking 
account of algorithmic complexity.
3.2.1.2  The laser
There is a revised approach that 
seems to capture some of the relevant 
complexity. This uses a distinction 
between fundamental and derived objects 
and updates Occam’s Razor with what 
Jonathan Schaffer (Schaffer, 2015) calls 
the laser – “do not multiply fundamental 
objects without necessity”. He illustrates 
the difference between the razor and the 
laser with this example. Imagine Esther 
posits a fundamental theory with 100 
types of fundamental particle. Her theory 
is predictively excellent and is adopted 
by the scientific community. Then Feng 
comes along and—in a moment of genius—
builds on Esther’s work to discover a 
deeper fundamental theory with 10 types 
of fundamental string, which in varying 
combinations make up Esther’s 100 types 
of particle. This looks like a paradigm case 
of scientific progress in which a deeper, 
more unified, and more elegant theory 
replaces a shallower, less unified, and 
less elegant theory. However, under razor 
accounting, both the number of particles 
and strings are counted and therefore 
Feng’s theory has 10 more objects and so 
should be replaced with Esther’s. Under 
laser accounting though, 100 fundamental 
objects have been replaced by 10 – so 
Feng has made an improvement. Here 
again we have a distinction between 
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making a commitment and its cost. We 
make a commitment to both fundamental 
and derived objects, but the cost of 
derived objects is significantly less than 
that of fundamental objects.
As Schaffer notes, what emerges from this 
approach is a general pressure towards 
a permissive and abundant view of what 
there is, coupled with a restrictive and 
sparse view of what is fundamental. As he 
notes, classical mereology (the relations 
of parts to wholes)and pure set theory 
(where the only sets, well-determined 
collections of objects, under consideration 
are those whose members are also sets) 
come out as paradigms of methodological 
virtue, for making so much from so little. 
This suggests a preference for, what 
has been called, plenitude – not placing 
unnecessary constraints on what can 
exist; if it is possible for something to exist, 
then it does. Both classical mereology and 
(impure) set theory exhibit this. Simplifying 
a little, in classical mereology, given any 
two objects, their fusion exists – in set 
theory, their set exists. Where many of 
the candidate TLOs make explicit their 
mereological position, they chose classical 
mereology. However, where they make 
explicit their position on types, only a 
significant minority adopt a position of 
plenitude. Schaffer suggests a principle 
to capture this, the Ontological Bang 
for the Buck principle: optimally balance 
minimization of fundamental objects 
with maximization of derivative objects, 
especially useful ones.
3.2.1.3  Fruitfulness
In 3.2.1.1 above, fruitfulness was mentioned 
as being associated with simplicity. The 
examples provided above show, derivative 
objects are part of what makes a package 
of fundamental objects fruitful. In other 
words, they show that these fundamental 
objects can be used to produce something 
useful. However, as discussed, there is 
a need to be sensitive to both cost and 
benefits. If two very similar theories 
had roughly the same cost in terms of 
fundamental objects, but one had a large 
commitment to many useless entities 
but the other did not – and they were 
similar in all other relevant respects, this 
seems like overgeneration. The additional 
useless plenitude is more like profligacy 
or promiscuity – it is not fruitfulness. This 
gives us a ‘useful’ basis for assessing the 
TLOs.
4  Ontological commitment 
overview
Our overview of the framework for 
ontological commitments is divided 
into three parts:
1.  Section 4.1 looks at the general 
choices TLOs make on whether 
and what kind of overall ontological 
commitment to make;
2.  Section 4.2 looks at the overall 
formal structure; and
3.  Section 4.3 considers the individual 
core commitments that lead to that 
structure.
More detailed technical notes are 
given in Appendix I.
4.1   General choices
The general choices track the ontological 
approach chosen by the top-level 
ontologies. They firstly note whether 
the TLO has chosen to make ontological 
commitments or not. They then note 
whether the ontological commitment is 
lightweight or heavyweight (see 4.1.2). 
Finally, they note what they have chosen 
to make the subject of their ontological 
commitments; natural language or the 
(foundational) real world (this is discussed 
in 4.1.3). Our survey includes examples 
of TLOs making all these choices and this 
range provides useful examples to compare 
and contrast as well as a comprehensive 
range of components that could be useful 
in developing a TLO.
4.1.1  Ontologically committed: 
ontological or generic
The top-level ontologies longlist was 
compiled to include any data models 
that might have content useful for the 
construction of a top-level ontology. Hence, 
one of the key conditions for inclusion is 
that the model must be sufficiently general 
to include content that might be useful.
There are cases where the TLO specifies a 
data structure with no intended ontological 
commitment; to deliberately leave open 
how the data is modelled. A classic 
indication of this is where the modeller 
can validly choose which data type to 
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use in a model (whether something is 
modelled as an entity or attribute) based 
upon, typically, performance requirements. 
These TLOs are classified as generic; Topic 
Maps and Schema.org are examples of 
this. One consequence of this choice is 
that these top-level ‘ontologies’ are not 
able to harness the interoperability benefits 
of adopting ontological commitments 
mapping to the real world (discussed 
above).
4.1.2  High or low ontological 
commitment
Where TLOs are ontologically committed, 
the analysis reveals that some have 
explicitly committed to most, if not all, 
of the choices whereas others have 
only committed to a few. This gives us 
a good basis for distinguishing between 
the heavyweight TLOs that are highly 
committed and the lightweight TLOs that 
are only committed to a few.
4.1.3  Subject: appearance or reality: 
natural language or foundational 
ontology
One can broadly classify top-level 
ontologies into two kinds by their subject 
matter. The subject matter can be what a 
community implicitly accepts when using 
a language – a natural language ontology. 
This will take the surface structure of the 
language, for example the distinction 
between nouns and verbs (or the words it 
uses), as a window on the ontology. Or it 
can be an ontology of what ‘really’ exists 
according to science (and philosophy) – a 
foundational ontology. This is suspicious 
of the surface structure of the language as 
it has often turned out to be a false friend. 
For example, the English language classes 
tomatoes as a vegetable, but this has not 
persuaded botanists to stop classifying 
them as ‘really’ a fruit.
The natural language ontology may include 
merely conceived objects as well as those 
that happen to be actual – whereas the 
foundational ontology should only include 
actual ones, as well as some infrastructure 
to help assure that they are actual. The 
natural language ontology may focus on 
the linguistic structure of the language or 
on the concepts implied by the language. 
See Appendix I for a more detailed 
background.
Some TLOs on our longlist have explicitly 
stated their aspirations to one or other 
kind of subject matter – and provided the 
appropriate infrastructure. Clear examples 
are DOLCE as a natural language ontology; 
BFO and BORO as foundational ontologies. 
Some TLOs with no stated aspirations 
are clearly focussed on language and its 
linguistic infrastructure (nouns, verbs, etc.) 
and thereby categorised natural language 
ontologies: Wordnet and FrameNet are 
good examples.
Sometimes it is difficult to make the case 
for a classification; where there is neither 
a clear statement of intent nor clear 
infrastructure for one or other approach. 
These have not been classified.
Where one’s focus is on the language used 
in a community, then, other things being 
equal, a natural language ontology makes 
a better fit. If the focus is on reality, then 
a model of what really exists makes more 
sense. However, both kinds of ontology 
should be considered as useful sources for 
components for a TLO.
4.1.4 Categorical
There is a long tradition of categorical 
ontologies, where the types of the ontology 
are meant to be comprehensive, covering 
all types of thing that can exist – or, at the 
very least, a broad swathe; Aristotle and 
Kant’s Categories are historic examples of 
this. In principle, one would expect a TLO 
to be categorical. However, in practice, 
the comprehensiveness is often limited. In 
some cases, the scope is limited to a broad 
family of domains – such as MIMOSA’s 
focus on asset information for machinery 
and systems. In other cases, the TLO 
adopts a cautious position and its ontology 
is explicitly left open-ended allowing for 
extensions that involve new top-level 
categories, so making the TLO technically 
non-categorical – BFO is an example of this.
4.1.5 General classifications
In summary, the general level has the 
following classifications:
Figure 1 provides a visual summary of this.
category type choice
general ontologically committed ontological or generic
general commitment level high or low (heavyweight or lightweight)
general subject foundational or natural language
general categorical yes or no
Figure 1 – General classification of the TLOs
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4.2   Formal structure –  
horizontal and vertical
Many, if not most, of the ontological 
choices leave their mark on the formal 
structure, the ontological architecture, 
of the TLOs in characteristic ways; this 
section is about two ways we use these 
marks to classify them – which we tag 
vertical and horizontal aspects.
Three core hierarchical relations – each 
usually visualised upwards – provide a 
backbone to the TLOs. The ontological 
choices shape these upwards (vertical) 
structures in various ways – and we use 
these ways to characterise the impact of 
the choices on the TLOs on the ontological 
architecture.
If one looks in more detail at one of these 
hierarchies – the super-sub-type hierarchy 
– then one can see a repeating pattern 
of stratification across the hierarchy 
(horizontal) that mark particular choices. 
We use these to determine whether the 
TLO has made a particular choice.
These two ways of looking at the formal 
structure (the ontological architecture) – 
tagged vertical and horizontal aspects 
– map neatly onto the simplicity basis 
introduced above. There we divided 
simplicity broadly into structural and 
ontological – roughly the shape of the 
organising structure and the number of 
objects. The vertical aspect deals with the 
structure, and so structural simplicity, of 
the various hierarchies; roughly their shape 
up and down. The horizontal aspect deals 
with the broad ontological choices that can 
introduce a division across the hierarchy 
(horizontal stratification) – which impacts 
the ontological simplicity – as they increase 
the number of objects. Taking a broad-
brush view, this section of the framework 
separates the vertical and horizontal 
aspects of the formal hierarchies.
In practical terms, these characterise 
the formal structures that arise in the 
ontological architecture from the various 
ontological choices. Together these 
form the backbone of the ontological 
architecture upon which the flesh of the 
ontology is built. Here we identify the 
broad structures and outline how their 
component ontological commitments fit 
into this structure. In the next section, we 
look inwards into the specific details of the 
commitments – rather than outwards at 
their impact of the structure.
4.2.1  Vertical aspect – varieties of 
hierarchies
There is a core of basic ontological 
hierarchical relations that are typically 
found in top-level ontologies; whole-part, 
type-instance and super-sub-type (they 
go by various names, these are the ones 
we adopt in this paper – Table 1 lists some 
alternatives with examples).
Table 1 – Hierarchal relations – terms
Adopted term Alternative terms Examples
whole-part part of This building has a whole-part relation to my front door (my front door is part of this building) 
type-instance instantiation, class-member, member, instance
Building has a type-instance relation to this 
building (this building is an instance/member of 
the type building – this building is a building)
super-sub-type generalisation, subsumption, super-type, sub-type
Opening has a super-sub-type relation to door 
and window (door and window are sub-types of 
opening – doors and windows are openings)
There is debate about whether some of 
these are fundamental (for example, super-
sub-type can be defined in terms of type-
instance). There is also debate whether 
these all belong to the same family of 
relations or are distinct types. Whatever 
the outcome of these debates, as noted 
earlier, in practice these hierarchies are a 
key part of the backbone of the ontological 
architecture. One powerful way they 
do this is through their formal structure. 
Here we look at the formal properties of 
hierarchies and how these apply to the 
three relations – to see how they, together, 
help shape the ontological architecture. We 
outline the properties below and consider 
their relevance to the three relations.
These three relations normally manifest 
as hierarchies; in other words, they have 
the structure of a partially ordered set 
(or in the case of type-instance, it’s cover 
relation, as it is not transitive). They are 
standardly represented in an obvious way 
in Hasse diagrams (sometimes known as 
upward diagrams) as a directed acyclic 
graph – nodes connected by arrows that 
have no cycles – see Figures 1 to 6 below. 
We use these diagrams to show the formal 
structures we are examining. The relations 
have a conventional direction, given in 
Table 2.
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There are some TLOs – such as Entity-
Attribute-Relation (the original Chen 
version) – where there are no super-sub-
type relations. This is often found in the 
physical implementation – SQL being a 
clear example. Further, it is often the case 
that whole-part relations are not explicitly 
marked, in other words, separated out from 
other relations.
Typically, TLOs will have a range of 
choices on how they constrain the three 
hierarchies – 4.2.1.1 to 4.2.1.8 identify the 
relevant choices which we use below 
to analyse the TLOs. Often, as noted 
earlier, the underlying question is whether 
these constraints breach an explanatory 
sufficiency (plenitude) principle and so 
unnecessarily limit expressiveness. As 
always, there is often various factors in 
play, so the decision is not clear cut.
4.2.1.1 Parent-child-arity
In hierarchies, the number of parents a 
node can have is the parent-arity, the 
number of children the child-arity (note 
that the number of parents may differ from 
the number of ancestors). In some TLOs 
some of the relations have their parent-
arity or child-arity limited to one. This 
changes the structure from lattice-like to 
tree-like (see Figure 2).





Figure 2 – Parent-child-arity structures in Hasse diagram format
The way these constraints are typically 
applied to the three relations is outlined 
in Table 3; which shows that the relevant 
choices are for type-instance and super-
sub-type. In the object-oriented modelling 
community, these are known respectively 
as single or multiple classification and 
single or multiple inheritance.
Table 3 – General parent-child-arity
Relation general direction-arity
general parent-arity general child-arity
whole-part always unconstrained always unconstrained
type-instance single or unconstrained always unconstrained
super-sub-type single or unconstrained always unconstrained
Constraining the hierarchy to a single 
parent is prima facie parsimonious. 
However, it also seems prima facie 
explanatorily insufficient. Why should a 
type such as mare not have female and 
horse as its supertypes? Why should an 
individual such as Donald Trump not be an 
instance of the types ‘human being’ and 
‘biologically male’? These choices for single 
parent structures look likely to be less 
than optimal unless there are other factors 
counting in their favour.
4.2.1.2 Super-sub-type – transitivity
We focus here on the transitivity of the 
super-sub-type relation. Type-instance is 
generally considered not to be transitive 
and whole-part to be transitive.
The super-sub-type relation can be found 
in the early logic, in, for example, Aristotle’s 
syllogisms – in the assertion that ‘Every 
S is P’ (Every Human is an Animal). This 
can be translated into ‘S is a sub-type of 
P’ (Human is a sub-type of Animal). Its 
explicit recognition as a relation came with 
the nineteenth century mathematization 
of logic by Boole and others. Implicit 
visualisations of it as containment appear in 
Euler and Venn circles. However, it is more 
commonly visualised now as a hierarchy 
diagram – where the links represent 
instances of the sub-type relation. The 
majority of the graphic representations of 
the TLOs (in Appendix E) are super-sub-
type hierarchy diagrams.
However, some care needs to be taken 
when interpreting these diagrams – as they 
only show the cover relation (parents and 
children with no ancestors or descendants). 
The traditional semantics of super-sub-
type is transitive: if every B is A and every 
C is B, then it seems clear that every C 
is A. So, ancestors or descendants are 
automatically included (though not shown 
in the diagrams).
In some TLOs, their version of super-
sub-type is not transitive – ancestors 
or descendants are not automatically 
included. Typically, only the links shown in 
the hierarchy are deemed to exist. The UML 
TLO is an example of this, which is most 
likely driven by implementation rather than 
semantic concerns. This choice should be 
made explicit.
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A similar kind of interpretation situation 
occurs when the super-sub-type hierarchy 
diagram only shows the relevant types. 
This is commonplace where the TLO 
supports extensional types. In this case, 
where a super-sub-type hierarchy diagram 
shows B as a sub-type of A, one cannot 
automatically infer that B is a child sub-
type of A – as there may be intervening 
sub-types. An extensional TLO allows any 
collection of objects to be a type. If there 
is more than one instance of A that is not 
an instance of B – for example c and d in 
Figure 3, then there is a type C which has 
the members of B plus c as its members. 
C is not identical to either A or B as it has 
c but does not have d as a member. C is 
however a super-type of B and a sub-
type of A This hopefully illustrates how 
ontological commitments impact upon 
the interpretation of these diagrams. This 
choice is dealt with under the formal 
generation section.
4.2.1.3 Boundedness
Hierarchies as ordered relations might or 
might not have a top or bottom. As shown 
in Figure 2, the hierarchy is bounded if 
all of the maximal paths terminate, and 
unbounded if any maximal path does 
not terminate, though, as the diagram 
also shows, some may. The hierarchy 
is upwards bounded if all the maximal 
paths terminate upwards, and the set of 
terminating nodes are the top elements of 
the hierarchy. The hierarchy is downwards 
bounded if all the maximal paths terminate 
downwards, and the set of terminating 
nodes are the bottom elements of the 
hierarchy.
These four options permute into four 
possible configurations. One of them, 
upwards and downwards bounded, opens 
up the possibility of further constraining 
the hierarchy to a finite number of levels.
The interesting hierarchical relation for 
us, in the top-level ontologies we have 
reviewed, is type-instances. The first 
interesting case for us is firstly, whether 
type-instances is downwards bounded – 
the left-most case in Figure 4.
Figure 3 – Intervening subtypes
Type-instance downwards boundedness is 
associated with the universals-particulars 
division that goes back to the Ancient 
Greek Aristotle, and beyond; where 
universals have instances, but particulars 
do not (another way of defining bottom). 
All seriously ontologically committed top-
level ontologies make this division. Some 
of the generic ontologies have meta-
models that place no constraints on the 
hierarchy. An example would be OWL’s use 
of punning; it does not identify a bottom 
level, so it is always possible to extend 
downwards. The Topic Map Reference 
Model is similarly unconstrained.
A pragmatic argument for this lack of 
constraint is that it is too onerous to build 
the bound into the model at design time, 
and that it is more useful to let the users at 
runtime decide on whether or not to extend 
the hierarchy down a level. This then 
places the onus on the users to ensure 
the quality of the boundary, to ensure, for 
example, that something that is clearly an 
individual, such as Donald Trump, has no 
instances.
Figure 4 – Possible boundedness options in Hasse diagram format
Figure 5 – Fixed level boundedness
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Then if type-instance is also, upwards 
bounded – the left-most case in Figure 5; 
there is a choice as to whether it is finitely 
bounded to a fixed number of levels – and 
if so, to how many levels. If TLOs are so 
constrained, they are often fixed to either 
three or two levels. Figure 5 has examples 
of two and three levels. OMG’s Meta Object 
Facility (MOF) is a case whether there are 
four.
The way these constraints are typically 
applied to the type-instance relations 
is outlined in Table 4; the boundedness 
choices for the other two relations 
(whole-part and super-sub-type) are not 
sufficiently interesting to make it to the 
framework.
relation downwards bounded fixed finitely bounded fixed number of levels
type-instance can be unbounded or bounded
fixed finitely bounded or 
not
often two or three, but 
can be more
Table 4 – Type-instance boundedness options
4.2.1.4 Intransitive vertical stratification
Type-instance is intransitive – for example, 
if a is an instance of type b and b is an 
instance of type c – it does not follow that 
a is an instance of type c. This allows us to 
distinguish between cases where a node’s 
descendants could have its ancestors 
as parents – and where it does not (for 
transitive relations, it is always the case). 
This affects the structure and is visible in 
the hierarchy’s Hasse diagram as illustrated 
by Figure 6. Also, stratified hierarchies can 
be ranked – also illustrated in Figure 6.
Another way of characterising this is as 
a distinction between hierarchies where 
each new rank can only be constructed, 
or based upon, the components of the 
previous rank (stratified) – and ones that 
can be constructed from all earlier ranks 
(unstratified). Of course, in cases of two 
levels, the previous rank is all earlier 
ranks, so it is a limit case of stratified. The 
standard technical terms for these are 
stratified and unstratified respectively – so 
we use them. This vertical stratification is 
a different sense of stratified from the one 
used in horizontal stratification; it is worth 
paying attention to the different senses.
Ontologies that are defined using meta-
models and meta-meta-models, such 
as UML and MOF, are typically stratified. 
Extensional ontologies, such as those 
based upon BORO and IDEAS, are usually 
unstratified. This distinction is much 
discussed in the mathematics of set and 
type theory, where sets are unstratified 
and types stratified.
The stratified approach, by some measures, 
is less structurally simple as it involves 
more restrictions. Also, as one can see 
from the Figure 6, the stratified approach 
is ontologically parsimonious and the 
unstratified approach plenitudinous. The 
key question is which provides more 
relevant expressiveness. This naturally 
leads to questions about what motivates 
the stratification restriction – there does 
not seem to be a good ontological answer 
for this.
4.2.1.5 Formal generation
Ontology models are typically built through 
the careful manual addition of references 
to objects in the model. However, this is 
not the only way the structure in the model 
is created. Some top-level ontologies 
include algorithms for automatically adding 
new objects to the model. This is known 
as formal generation, as there are formal 
(algorithmic) rules for the generation. If we 
want a rounded picture of the structure, we 
need to consider this formal generation as 
well.
There are a variety of types of algorithm 
that can be adopted. For our broad-brush 
picture, we just consider two core cases 
here: fusion and complement, the first an 
upwards (parent) generation the second 
a downwards (child) generation. This is 
enough to give a measure of the generative 
approach. Fusion is where one is given 
two objects of the right kind and then 
one can infer the existence of their parent 
fusion. Classic cases are mereological 
fusion and the pairing axiom in set theory 
– a whole that consists exactly of two or 
more particulars. Complement is where, 
when one is given a parent and one of 
its children, one can infer the existence 
of another child that is the rest of the 
parent. As Figure 7 shows, the formal 
generation produces both the object and 
its hierarchical relation(s).
Figure 6 – Ranks: vertically stratified and unstratified
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As Table 5 – formally generative options 
shows, there are choices for both these 
modes of generation for all three relations 
except for type-instance and complement. 
To see why type-instance is an exception, 
consider a singleton type A = {a}. It has 
the single instance a, but there is no 
complement of a.
Figure 7 – Two kinds of formal generation
relations formally generative
fusion complement
whole-part yes or no yes or no
type-instance yes or no typically, no
super-sub-type yes or no yes or no
Adopting formal generation for each of the 
three relations can be seen as examples 
of plenitude; all possible applications of 
the rule are automatically allowed. But 
this raises questions of whether there 
is overgeneration (see discussion on 
Basis in 3.2.1 above).  Could these be 
examples of profligacy and promiscuity? 
Given the inter-related nature of TLOs, 
this assessment needs to be done in 
the context of all the choices made by 
the TLO. However, a prima facie case for 
them can be made on the basis of their 
close association with the two standard 
examples of ontological economy, classical 
mereology and set theory.
Table 5 – formally generative options
4.2.1.6 Relation class-ness
The concept of first- and second-class 
objects was introduced by Christopher 
Strachey in the 1960s (Strachey, 2000). 
A second-class object is one that is not 
given the same ‘rights’ as other objects, a 
first-class object has the same rights as 
other objects. The particular right we are 
considering here is whether an object can 
be an instance of a type. If the three core 
relations are first-class objects, then they 
can be. Though the details differ slightly for 
the three relations, in each case, this allows 
for a (type-instance) link in our Hasse 
diagrams that starts with a link – as shown 
in Figure 8. The resultant graph structure is 
known as a hyper-graph.
Figure 8 – First-class relations Hasse diagram
Whole-part relations are usually first-class. 
Type-instance and super-sub-type are 
often second-class but can be first-class
Table 6 – Relation class
relation class
whole-part usually first
type-instance often second, but can be first
super-sub-type often second, but can be first
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Imposing second-class-ness on these 
relations is a restriction on plenitude – as 
it introduces a block on the existence 
of possible objects. Hence, recognising 
all three relations as first-class would 
be an example of plenitude; all possible 
applications of the type-building rule are 
automatically allowed. The question then 
arises whether this plenitude veers into 
profligacy and promiscuity. It turns out that 
the standard pattern for classification, as 
used by Linnaeus in his taxonomy, needs 
these first-class objects (see Formalization 
of the classification pattern (Partridge, 
2016) and Business Objects (Partridge, 
1996).
4.2.1.7 Vertical structures
These vertical classifications are shown 
below.
Figure 9 provides a visual summary of this.
type relation characteristic choice
parent-arity type-instance single or unconstrained
parent-arity super-sub-type single or unconstrained
boundedness type-instance downwards bounded or unbounded
boundedness type-instance fixed finite levels fixed or not fixed
boundedness type-instance number of fixed levels [a number]
(vertical) stratification type-instance stratified or unstratified
formal generation whole-part fusion yes or no
formal generation whole-part complement yes or no
formal generation type-instance fusion yes or no
formal generation super-sub-type fusion yes or no
formal generation super-sub-type complement yes or no
relation class-ness type-instance first- or second-class
relation class-ness super-sub-type first- or second-class
4.2.1.8 Other vertical structures
There are a number of other vertical 
structures that have not been included as 
they are less relevant. These include:
•  connectedness
•  restricted single type-instance parent-
arity – single classification.
Connectiveness
It is not necessarily the case that any 
two nodes in the graph are connected. 
If some nodes are not connected, then 
the graph is disconnected. In this case, 
the disconnected graph can be divided 
into connected graphs. See the section 
below on possibilia for an application. 
While the connectedness of the structure 
is important, there is no overall pattern 
in these core relations that allows us to 
broadly characterise the owning TLO.
Single classification
There are some groups of types where 
one would expect the instances to belong 
to only one type – in other words, the 
types partition their instances. Quantities 
are an example. We would not expect 
something to have two masses, to both 
weigh 5 kg and 10 kg – it weighs one or the 
other. Similarly, for qualities, we would not 
expect an object to be both coloured and 
transparent at the same time, it has to be 
one or the other. This kind of restriction 
is common in TLOs, but again there is no 
overall pattern that allows us to broadly 
characterise the owning TLO.
Figure 9 – Visual summary of the vertical aspects
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4.2.2  Horizontal aspects: stratification 
versus unification
There is a group of fundamental choices 
that impact the ontological architecture 
which involves whether or not to make a 
distinction. If one chooses not to make 
the distinction, one only introduces a 
single type. If one chooses to make the 
distinction, one introduces two types; one 
for each alternative. The choice boils down 
to whether to horizontally stratify or unify. 
One can describe choosing to make the 
distinction as ‘separating one potentially 
unified type into two’, creating a horizontal 
stratification in the hierarchy – and not 
making the distinction, ‘unifying the 
potentially separated two types into one’.
These choices are perhaps best explained 
by looking at the specific cases (see 4.2.2.1 
to 4.2.2.8). We only consider the major 
cases relevant to our review of the TLO 
candidates. We focused on identifying the 
formal choice – whether to horizontally 
stratify or unify – and leave the other 
aspects driving the decision to the more 
detailed description later in the report (see 
4.3). We have mostly described the choices 
from a unifying perspective, they could 
equally well have been described from a 
stratifying perspective.
4.2.2.1 Spacetime
We start with one familiar from 20th 
century physics. Prior to then, it was 
assumed that the spatial geometry of 
the universe was independent of one-
dimensional time. There were two related 
but independent types, spatial regions 
(regions of space) and temporal regions 
(regions of time). The work of Einstein 
and Minkowski introduced the idea – 
which became accepted – that space 
and time could be fused into spacetime. 
Ontologically, this can be seen as unifying 
spatial regions and temporal regions into 
spatio-temporal regions whose instances 
are regions of spacetime. Figure 10 
provides some examples from the TLOs. 
BFO is an interesting case as it hyper-
separates, it separates but keeps the 
unifying type. This raises interesting 
ontological accounting questions about 
whether this is overgeneration (as so 
profligate) or interesting plenitude.
While space, time and spacetime 
may appear to be familiar notions for 
interpreting data, it turns out to be a tricky 
area to tie down formally. It takes some 
study to develop a clear idea of what the 
spacetime stratification choice here implies.
We can illustrate the choice simply as 
between a 1D time plus 3D space or a 4D 
spacetime – as shown in Figure 11 (based 
upon Figure 1 in (Gilmore, 2016))
Figure 10 – Separating spacetime – TLO examples
Figure 11 – Separation and unity of instances
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In many cases, as here, the stratification 
(or unification) of the types also implies 
a separation or unity of their instances. 
To appreciate the consequences of 
the choices, Figure 11 shows how 
three (simple) instances of locations 
end up under the two regimes – this is 
recapitulated in Table 7.
Table 7 – Three locations
location 1D time plus 3D space 4D spacetime
instant (in time) a (simple) point on the 1D 
timeline.
a (complex) horizontal slice in 
spacetime
a point of space a (simple) point in 3D space a (complex) vertical line in 
spacetime
a spacetime point A point in 3D space located at a 
point in 1D time.
a (simple) point in 4D space
An under-appreciated consequence of 
the separation is that 3D space is multiply 
located – it is located as a whole at each 
instant of 1D time.
Typically, a TLO will choose to stratify or 
unify the types and so separate or unify 
the instances. However, it can attempt 
to do both. As noted earlier, the TLO 
BFO provides us with an example. It opts 
to include both spacetime as well as 
space and time. This raises interesting 
semantic redundancies analogous to data 
redundancy. And so, a requirement that the 
spaces and times need to be coordinated 
with spacetimes – one can regard this 
as a kind of semantic or ontological 
denormalization analogous to database 
denormalization.
4.2.2.2 Locations
People often talk of physical objects and 
their locations, where physical objects 
occupy their locations, suggesting two 
related types; objects and locations (let’s 
leave the decision whether the location 
is spatial, temporal or spatiotemporal to 
the previous choice). For example, “today 
your car is parked in the same place as 
mine was yesterday” could be regarded 
as a location which was occupied by my 
car (a physical object) yesterday and 
your car today. There is a debate going 
back to Newton and Leibnitz in the 17th 
century as to whether location is absolute 
or relative. If it is relative, then location 
is clearly fundamentally different from 
physical objects – which aren’t. However, 
if it is absolute, a kind of substance, 
then this opens the possibility that one 
could unify objects and their locations 
as fundamentally the same, technically 
known as supersubstantivalism. If one does 
not have cases of interpenetration (see 
4.3.3) then this resolves the oddity where 
physical objects exactly occupy a single 
location throughout their life – unifying 
eliminates this double-counting. If there 
is interpenetration, then two objects may 
collapse to the same location – which may 
have unintended consequences. After 
the unification, the physical object and 
its location, two kinds of substance, are 
replaced by a single supersubstantival 
object. One has a broad choice between 
separating or unifying physical objects and 
locations.
4.2.2.3 Properties
In language, there is a distinction between 
nouns and adjectives; between rose and 
red. This has been taken as an indication of 
a more fundamental distinction, between 
what are known as substances and the 
properties or qualities they bear, for 
example, where a red rose would have a 
rose substance that bears a red property/
quality. However, in other contexts, such 
as a Venn or Euler diagrams, we would be 
happy to have overlapping circles for roses 
and red objects – with a single icon for 
each red rose in the overlap. This implies 
there are instances of the type object that 
belonged to both the lower level types 
rose and red. So, here is a choice between 
stratifying to substances as the bearers of 
properties or unifying to objects.
4.2.2.4 Endurants
Philosophers have noted that people say 
some types of object, such as stones 
and chairs, exist; whereas other types, 
events, occur or happen or take place. It is 
suggested that this marks a fundamental 
distinction between continuants and 
occurrents – where occurrents (that occur) 
are the events that happen to continuants 
(that exist). There is a competing view that 
there is no fundamental difference between 
the two, rather a different perspective on 
the same object – this has been labelled 
perdurantist. A classic example (for 
perdurantists) is glaciers.  From a day to 
day perspective they are solid, unmoving 
material objects – they exist and so 
could be classified as continuants. From 
a geological perspective, glaciers flow – 
they are events like the flowing of a river 
– so could be classified as occurrents. A 
common continuant/occurrent stance, is 
that there are two glaciers; the existing 
continuant and the flowing occurrent. A 
perdurantist stance would be there is a 
single perdurants object which can be 
looked at from two perspectives.
4.2.2.5 Immaterial
Philosophers have suggested that the hole 
inside a doughnut is different from the 
doughnut. The doughnut is composed of 
stuff whereas the hole is not composed 
anything – it is defined by the doughnut. 
They suggest making a stratification where 
the doughnut is a material object and its 
hole is an immaterial object dependent 
upon the material doughnut. A unifying 
stance would not regard this distinction as 
fundamental and not recognise material 
and immaterial are fundamental types in 
its ontology. The hole has a spatial extent 
that contains matter, though this matter 
may well change over time. In a sense it 
is ‘immaterial’ what matter is in the hole, 
but this does not, by itself, make it either 
immaterial or a fundamentally different kind 
of object.
4.2.2.6 Summary
Table 8 lists these specific cases, and the 
stratifying relations that typically relate 
the separated objects. All of these choices 
are present in some of the TLOs we have 
surveyed. The list is not intended to be 
complete but gives an indicative picture of 
the range of stratifications. For example, 
there is a further major choice, whether 
to make a distinction between form and 
matter (often known as hylomorphism 
– for more details see “Form vs. Matter” 
(Ainsworth, 2020)). Even though this is 
currently an active area of research, we 
have found no examples of this among the 
candidate TLOs. So, we merely note the 
choice here and omit it from the list.
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4.2.2.7 Stratification journey
There is limited inter-dependence between 
the choices meaning that a range of 
permutations are possible. For a top-
level ontology, one can visualise the 
architectural stratification choices being 
adopted in a sequence, starting with no 
stratifications and introducing the choices 
one or two at a time – as illustrated in the 
figures below. This sequence or journey 
is a rational reconstruction – the original 
development of the top-level ontology is 
most likely ad hoc and bottom up. However, 
this reconstruction gives us a good picture 
of the underlying architecture.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show a four stage 
example top-level ontology stratification 
journey (or sequence) for BFO, which 
includes multiple stratifications– where 
five choices result in six strata. Figure 14, 
shows a journey with no choices resulting a 
single stratum based upon the IDEAS TLO. 
Finally, Figure 15 is the legend for these 
stratification journey diagrams.
Table 8 – Summary of the horizontal stratification choices introduced
Label Unified type Separate types Stratifying relation
spacetime spatio-temporal 
objects
spatial objects, temporal 
objects
spaces are multiply located 
at times (though this is often 
a derived relation – from an 
occupying object’s links to 





objects are (exactly) located 
at their locations
properties objects substances, properties substances are bearers of 
properties
endurants perdurants continuants, occurrents occurrent is dependent upon 
continuant
immaterial (physical) objects material objects, 
immaterial objects
immaterial objects are part of 
material objects
Figure 12 – An example top-level ontology stratification journey – BFO stages 1 to 3
Figure 13 – An example top-level ontology stratification journey – BFO stage 4
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As these examples show, choosing to make 
the distinction stratifies the architecture – 
choosing to not make it, correspondingly, 
unifies it. From the perspective of 
fundamental parsimony, making the 
distinction is always multiplicative, 
simpliciter – in the sense that it results 
in two fundamental types rather than 
one. It is also, in many cases, even more 
multiplicative in that it introduces a new 
type of fundamental relation between the 
separated types. There can be a variety 
of reasons for making the distinction. The 
interesting question for us is whether the 
cost accounting shows this worthwhile. It 
is often difficult to do this for the individual 
stratifications as useful derived objects – 
including fruitfulness ones – often emerge 
from the way the choices interact.
4.2.2.8 Other divisions
A common division, often mentioned, is 
the division into universals and particulars. 
However, unlike the stratification choices 
we have looked at above, this is not really a 
stratification. As we noted when looking at 
boundedness above, this is better seen as 
a choice as to whether the type-instance 
relation is downwards bounded.
Figure 14 – An example top-level ontology stratification journey with no stratification - IDEAS
Figure 15 – Legend for stratification journey diagrams
4.3 Universal commitments
The section focuses on the details of 
the commitments themselves. It focuses 
on universal commitments; ones that 
one would expect to be exercised in all 
(or almost all) domains. Some of these 
commitments have appeared in the 
previous section – as they impact directly 
upon the ontological architecture of the 
hierarchies. We deal with the details of 
these first (see 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Type-instance
It is relatively easy to find examples of 
this relation. The cat called Holly is an 
instance of the type cat. My hand is an 
instance of the type hand. However, it 
has a variety of potential ontological 
explanations depending upon the details 
of the ontological commitment. The 
vertical and horizontal aspects help to 
characterise what has been chosen, but 
heavyweight TLOs will typically fill in more 
detail. This can vary substantially – as 
the following simplified examples show. 
One form of explanation is that types are 
the collection of their instances – often 
labelled extensional. In this case, the 
type-instance relation boils down to being 
a member of that collection.  Another, 
form of explanation is that the instance 
exemplifies the type and so is in a way 
partially identical to it. So, Holly exemplifies 
cat-ness, in the sense that she is partially 
identical to it. Similarly, my arm exemplifies 
arm-ness. This topic is subsumed under 
the more general topic criteria of identity 
and dealt with in 4.3.6.
4.3.2 Whole-part – mereology
Mereology (from the Greek μερος, ‘part’) 
is the theory of the whole-part relation. 
This relation is typically transitive, where 
if A is a part of B and B is a part of C then 
A is a part of C. This relation has been 
extensively formalised where a number 
of decomposition principles have been 
identified of various strengths from which 
one can build the overall theory. These 
start with the weakest, core mereology 
(CM) though minimal mereology (MM) and 
extensional mereology (EM) to general 
extensional mereology (GEM) (The logical 
formulation of these can be found in (Varzi, 
2019)). If a TLO makes its mereology 
explicit, one would expect it to adopt 
a selection of the identified principles, 
typically one of these variants above. 
Indeed, a number of the TLOs adopt GEM.
Mereology is closely related to topology, 
in the sense of the ways in which objects 
overlap and connect. This is why mereology 
is often extended to mereotopology. This 
has also been extensively formalised 
giving rise to a range of theories, with the 
strongest theory being General Extensional 
Mereotopology with Closure conditions 
(GEMTC). A detailed description of this 
can be found in (for example) Chapter 4 
of Casati and Varzi’s Parts and places: 
the structures of spatial representation 
(Casati, 1999). Again, if a TLO makes its 
mereotopology explicit, one would expect 
it to adopt a selection of the identified 
principles – or be able to provide its own.
4.3.3  Interpenetration: 
location and mereology 
(supersubstantivalism+)
The separation of location and objects 
provides a simpler background 
for explaining how mereology and 
interpenetration interact. Consider the 
standard example of a statue and the clay 
it is made of. Under one view, the statue 
and the clay are different objects and they 
share no parts. However, they do share a 
location. We typically introduce a direct 
relation to capture this, saying the statue 
is composed of clay. We also assume that 
the statue and the clay have separate 
parts and parthood relations, but that the 
parts of the statue align with the parts 
of the clay. So, if an arm (a part of the 
statue) breaks off, the corresponding part 
of the clay does too. There is some kind 
of mereological divorce and associated 
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harmony or coordination. There are other 
kinds of similar cases. Consider a road 
that marks an administrative boundary. We 
could say the road and boundary share a 
location, but do not overlap – they share 
no common parts. In general, we say that 
two objects interpenetrate when they do 
not share parts, but their locations do – 
and the two examples above are cases of 
interpenetration.
We are faced with here a choice about 
how we want to deal with these cases. 
We can adopt a position, known as 
supersubstantivalism+, which does 
not allow the mereological divorce and 
coordination needed for interpenetration. 
Instead, it assumes there is no divorce, the 
objects share parts. At the times when 
the clay composes the statue, that part of 
the clay is part of the statue. At the times 
when the road marks the administrative 
boundary, they overlap, sharing common 
parts.
At a general level, supersubstantivalism+ 
is prima facie more qualitatively 
parsimonious as there is no need for the 
occupies relations. It is more quantitively 
parsimonious as there is no need for 
the separate parts – and their parthood 
relation. However, to make this position 
work it helps if one also has a unifying view 
of spacetime together with objects and 
their locations.
4.3.4  Materialism: abstract particulars 
and non-materialism
In modern thought, there is an attachment 
to the idea that the world is composed of 
only material objects that exist in space 
and time – and so one’s ontology is built 
from these material objects – (roughly) 
materialism. The idea behind this is that 
it is difficult to see how objects that exist 
outside space and time could affect the 
world and, in particular, could affect our 
minds such that we could know them. 
An alternative view is that there are also 
abstract particulars – individuals that have 
no existence or dependence on space 
or time. Numbers are often given as an 
example of these abstract objects. TLOs 
often explicitly commit to one or other view.
It is difficult to see how these abstract 
particulars could have an extension in 
the normal sense. As we discuss later in 
4.3.6, extension can be used as a basis 
for a view of identity. If one adopted this 
position, then one will probably favour the 
materialism choice and avoid the difficulty 
of developing an extensional criterion of 
identity for abstract particulars.
4.3.5  Possibilia: actual or possible 
worlds
Most information processing systems seem 
to involve possible objects that sometimes 
are not actual. When we arrange a meeting 
in the future that eventually does not take 
place, this is possible but not actual. When 
we draw up plans for a building that is not 
built, this is possible but not actual. The 
TLO needs to provide an account of such 
objects. In this regard, there is traditionally 
one major choice to be made. This is 
whether to limit existence to the actual 
world or allow it to range over (all) possible 
worlds.
If one adopts a possible worlds approach, 
then talk of possible objects becomes 
talk about objects in possible worlds. The 
possible meeting that did not happen 
in this world happened in some other 
possible world. The planned building that 
was not built in this actual world was 
built in some other possible world. If one 
restricts oneself to the actual world, one 
needs to develop alternative explanations 
for these objects. One example, called 
encoding, suggests talk about possible 
non-actual objects encodes the object – 
and that encoding works with a different 
logic that does not imply actual existence. 
There are a range of these alternatives 
in the literature, but none of these are 
as comprehensive or simple as possible 
worlds, which is why it almost universally 
adopted in the TLOs.
4.3.6  Criterion of identity: extensional 
or intensional
One of the key architectural choices for a 
top-level ontology is the basis or strategy 
for its criteria of identity. This establishes 
a key part of the infrastructure. These 
criteria determine for the various types 
of objects whether, in principle, so not 
necessarily in practice, selected objects 
are identical or different. There are two 
broad choices; extensional and intensional 
(with an ‘s’, not a ‘t’).
Extensional criteria of identity are 
compositional (constructional); where 
objects are identical if they are 
‘constructed’ from some external criteria – 
often involving its components. A classic 
example of an extensional object is sets, 
where sets composed (constructed) from 
the same members/components are 
identical. Another example is material 
objects’ identity defined in terms of 
spatiotemporal extension – making their 
identity dependent upon spatio-temporal 
regions. These regions then, typically, have 
identity defined in terms of equivalent 
(spatio-temporal) parts – assuming some 
kind of extensional mereology. So, two 
spatio-temporal regions will differ if one 
has a part that is not a part of the other.
Intensional criteria of identity aim to 
capture the meaning or essence of 
the entity; in practice this is typically 
represented as a definition. We can 
construct a classic example of an 
intensional object using the Euclidean 
equilateral triangle. Given Euclid’s Elements 
– Book I – Definition 14: “A figure is that 
which is contained by any boundary 
or boundaries” and Definition 20: “Of 
trilateral figures, an equilateral triangle is 
that which has its three sides equal.” An 
equilateral triangle is then defined as any 
figure with three sides, where these three 
sides are equal. This equilateral triangle 
object referred to by the definition has an 
extension, the set of figures it applies to 
– but it is, in principle, possible that other 
definitions will refer to different objects 
with the same extension.
One can get to the heart of the distinction 
as follows. Under an extensional strategy, 
any object with this set as its extension 
is equivalent – defining identical objects. 
However, this is not the case under 
the intensional strategy; two different 
intensional objects can have exactly the 
same extension without being identical. 
The subject has some key detailed 
technical aspects which are briefly 
summarised in Appendix B.
There are clear links here to other choices. 
Consider the choice between spacetime 
and space and time. Spatial extension (at 
a time) is insufficient for identity. There are 
lots of examples of objects that occupy 
exactly the same space at a time – at 
the time of writing, Donald Trump and 
the President of the United States is an 
example. However, spacetime is sufficient 
for identity in these cases – Donald 
Trump and the President of the United 
States have different spatio-temporal 
extents. This makes it natural to choose 
spacetime over space and time to open 
up the possibility for extensional identity 
based upon spacetime. There is a similar 
situation for types and their extension. In 
this actual world, there may not be enough 
verity to capture differences in meaning 
in the actual extensions. For example, 
the types renate (having a kidney) and 
cordate (having a heart) could have exactly 
the same extension. When we extend 
extension over possible worlds, then this 
becomes impossible. If it is possible to 
have animals with a heart but no kidney, 
then they will exist on some possible world. 
Making a choice for possible worlds over 
the single actual world creates the space 
for types to have extensional identity.
From an ontological engineering 
perspective, one can summarise the choice 
between the two as follows. An extensional 
strategy allows one to have, in principle, 
a clear, accurate criteria of identity – 
the extension. However, these are thin 
criteria, they do not attempt to capture 
the characteristics that one might use to 
identify the object. This is done elsewhere.
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An intensional strategy cannot provide 
clear, accurate principles as there is 
a difficulty giving these definitions to 
most common notions (person being 
an example). However, the definitions 
given are thick and typically contain 
the characteristics that enable easy 
identification.
Prima facie, an extensional strategy is 
useful when one needs to clearly and 
unambiguously identify objects. However, 
this choice comes entangled with other 
choices, so a case also needs to be made 
in the context of an integrated set of 
choices.
4.3.7  Time: presentist versus eternalist 
(including change)
Natural language is often tensed. We say 
“Jane was in Glasgow yesterday, she is 
in London today and she will be in Dover 
tomorrow” – using past, present and 
future tenses. We use the tenses in ways 
that imply existence. So, we say “there 
are no more dinosaurs” implying they no 
longer exist. Presentists believes that 
these tenses in ordinary language have 
an ontological significance. What is going 
on now really exists, what happens in the 
past has existed and what might happen in 
the future has yet to exist. The eternalists 
do not, they assume tenses have no real 
ontological significance.
One way to understand this position is 
to look at a problem it raises. Presentism 
prima facie imposes restrictions on cross-
time relations; relations where the relata 
are in different times – so never present 
at the same time. Being a great-great-
grandfather (for example) will typically 
involve people from different non-
overlapping times. Presentism would seem 
to deny the existence of any of these kinds 
of relations. There are, as always, ways 
around this, but this helps to illustrate the 
effect this choice has on the architecture.
We mention this choice here, as it is a 
well-recognised choice in philosophy 
textbooks and also in the computer/
applied ontology design. However, all the 
candidate top-level ontologies that make 
an explicit choice, choose eternalism. This 
is understandable from a data perspective. 
There would be a large processing 
overhead in having to switch tenses as 
objects ‘move’ from future to present to 
past.
4.3.8 Indexicals: here and now
If the previous choice is eternalism (which 
it is for all the candidate TLOs that make 
the choice) then this raises a new issue. 
How does one recapture the present? This 
is a key requirement. If one does not know 
when now is, then one loses track of all 
sorts of things. One can know the balance 
of an account at every point in time, but 
not be able to work out what the current 
balance is. Being able to represent the 
present is an obvious requirement for a 
system. One solution, if one is eternalist, is 
that one needs to include non-ontological 
epistemological (or agentological) aspects 
into the model for the system. For further 
discussion see Appendix I.
4.3.9 Relations – arity
We often think of relations as being 
between two objects. Examples are father-
of or earlier-than. However, there are 
relations of higher-order arity (greater than 
two) – an example of a three-place relation 
is: X is between Y and Z. This is an example 
of plenitude, where it is possible to have 
relations of higher order – where there is 
no, in principle, bound. Hence, it is worth 
noting whether TLOs support higher-order 
arity, and where they restrict themselves 
to two objects, what the motivation is. 
Pragmatically, higher-order relations are 
more difficult to implement, especially if 
there is not a low finite bound. In practice, 
one tends not to find relations with orders 
of more than a single digit – so a pragmatic 
finite bound may be acceptable when 
implementing.
The formal nature of relations is an active 
area of research. So, when doing the more 
detailed analysis within the framework and 
when looking in more detail at the TLOs, it 
may be worth looking at what position is 
taken on this. In particular, for extensional 
TLOs it may be worth considering their 
criterion of identity for relations. We do this 
in Appendix E.
4.3.10 Choices
These cash out into seven choices in the 
assessment framework.
Choice Alternatives
mereology standard (e.g. GEM) or not
interpenetration allowed or not allowed
materialism adopted or not adopted
possibilia possible worlds or actual world
criteria of identity intensional or extensional
time presentist or eternalist 
indexicals: here and now supported – not supported
higher arity supported – not supported
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5  Assessment Framework 
Results
The framework has three parts; 
general choices, formal structure and 
universal ontological commitments 
as discussed in 4.1, 4.2. and 4.3 
respectively. The details of the 
assessment are available online here 
(URL to be added) and the results are 
presented in 5.1 to 5.4 below.
5.1   General choices
Figure 16 shows the distribution of TLOs 
across the various choices. Figure 17 
shows the percentages for the main 
choices. It is worth noting there are more 
ontologically committed than generic TLOs 
in the candidate list – though this may be 
partially a result of the selection procedure, 
as we were not directly looking for 
generic TLOs. Also, there are slightly more 
lightweight than heavyweight TLOs.
Figure 16 – General choices – framework assessment
Figure 17 – Main general choices – percentages
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5.2   Formal structure: vertical 
aspects
The formal structure assessment has two 
parts; vertical and horizontal. This section 
deals with the vertical choices.  
The following figures give the percentages 
for each choice.
Figure 18 – Vertical aspects – commitment level – parent-arity
Figure 19 – Vertical aspects – commitment level – transitivity and boundedness
Figure 20 – Vertical aspects – commitment level – boundedness
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Figure 21 – Vertical aspects – commitment level – by type-instance – stratification
Figure 22 – Vertical aspects – commitment level – relation class-ness Figure 23 – Vertical aspects – commitment level – formal generation
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5.3   Formal structure: horizontal 
aspects
Figure 24 maps the TLOs against the 
horizontal aspects – the TLOs cluster at 
either end of the range of unification-
stratification. Figure 25 gives the 
percentages for each choice.
Figure 24 – Horizontal aspects – framework assessment
Figure 25 – Vertical aspects – percentages
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5.4   Universal commitments
Figure 26 maps the TLOs against the 
universal commitments – this shows that 
the heavyweight ontologies have the 
most commitments. Figure 27 gives the 
percentages for each choice.
Figure 26 – Universal commitments – framework assessment
Figure 27 – Universal – percentages
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6 Summary
We have developed a list of candidate 
TLOs – there are currently thirty seven 
listed in Appendix D (with ten more 
waiting in a queue to be analysed) 
and this will be updated as new TLOs 
are found. This provides a reasonably 
comprehensive picture of what is 
currently available.
We have developed a framework for 
providing an overarching top-down picture 
of the TLOs. This has three parts. It starts 
by looking at the general choices; whether 
to explicitly make ontological commitments 
and if so, whether to focus on natural 
language or the real world. It then looks at 
the formal structure. Finally, it reviews the 
range of choices of universal ontological 
commitments typically encountered in 
TLOs.
The formal structure is divided into two 
aspects. Firstly, the vertical aspects – the 
different kinds of formal structures that 
arise from the core ontological relations. 
Then the horizontal aspects – the different 
stratification and unifying choices driven 
by ontological commitments. The results of 
this assessment are in the previous section.
We have assessed the candidate TLOs 
based upon this framework. The table of 
results is available here (link to be added). 
This reveals that:
•  There are a range of levels of explicit 
ontological commitment, from little or 
none through lightweight to full-blown 
heavyweight commitment.
 ◦  In some cases, there is a deliberate 
decision not to make explicit 
ontological commitments, but in 
most cases, the choice seems less 
deliberate.
 ◦  In many cases, only a few of the 
choices of ontological commitment 
are explicitly made or are visible in 
the TLO’s structure. In these cases, 
the TLO is considered to have a 
lightweight commitment.
 ◦  One explanation for the lightweight 
explicit commitment may be the 
lack of a framework for making the 
commitments explicit.
 ◦  There is a small, but substantial 
number of cases where a majority of 
the choices are reasonably explicitly 
made.
•  Where an ontological commitment is 
made, some clearly focus on natural 
language, others on fundamental 
reality.
•  Whether or not a wide range of 
framework choices have been made 
is a good indicator of the level of 
ontological commitment.
 ◦  TLOs with a heavyweight ontological 
commitment, understandably, tend 
to explicitly, or otherwise, make a 
majority of the framework choices.
 ◦  TLOs with a lightweight ontological 
commitment, understandably, tend 
to explicitly, or otherwise, make a 
minority of the framework choices.
 ◦  Generic TLOs that have avoided 
explicit ontological commitment, 
often have clear vertical aspects 
in their formal structure, perhaps 
indicating the importance of these 
choices.
•  For the horizontal stratifying aspects, 
there is a general tendency for the 
heavyweight TLOs to either stratify or 
unify. This is a similar pattern to that 
found in philosophy, where stratifying 
(or unifying) choices tend to reinforce 
one another.
We have included in Appendix E a brief 
summary of the TLOs with, where available, 
a hierarchical picture of their top-most 
level. We have also added comments on 
particular details. A quick review of the 
hierarchical pictures reveals the vast 
range of top-level structures in current 
use. A comparison of the lightweight 
and heavyweight TLO hierarchies, still 
reveals a wide range of structures. The 
assessment framework helps to give 
some idea of where these are based on 
similar commitments and where they have 
different commitments.
The results of this survey will be used 
to perform a structured assessment of 
the TLOs identified herein, with a view 
to selecting one or more TLOs that will 
form the kernel around which the FDM will 
evolve. A further report – The FDM TLO 
Selection Paper – will be issued to describe 
this process in late 2020.
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Appendix A 
Pathway requirements for a 
Foundation Data Model
Extract from: The pathway towards an 
Information Management Framework: 
A ‘Commons’ for Digital Built Britain 
(2020) (Hetherington, 2020)
3.5.   A Foundation Data Model: clearing up the 
concepts.
Our Foundation data model will need to 
address the questions proper to top-level 
ontology, which can describe general 
concepts independent of a problem 
domain. Our FDM should be able to provide 
answers to:
•  Time, space and place: How does the 
ontology deal with time and space-
time? How does the ontology deal with 
places, locations, shape, holes and a 
vacuum?
•  Actuality and possibility: How does 
the ontology deal with what could 
happen or what could be the case, 
such as where multiple data sets give 
conflicting stories on the behaviour of 
a network?
•  Classes and types: How does 
the ontology deal with issues of 
classification?
•  Time and change: How does the 
ontology deal with time and change?
•  Parts, wholes, unity and boundaries: 
How does the ontology deal with 
relations of parthood?
•  Scale and granularity: How does the 
ontology deal with scale, resolution and 
granularity?
•  Qualities and other attributes: How 
does the ontology deal with qualities 
and other qualitative attributes?
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•  Quantities and mathematical 
entities: How does the ontology 
deal with quantitative data and with 
mathematical data and theories?
•  Processes and events: How does the 
ontology deal with processes?
•  Constitution: How does the ontology 
deal with the relation – sometimes 
referred to as a relation of “constitution” 
– between material entities and the 
material of which, at any given time, 
they are made?
•  Causality: How does the ontology deal 
with causality?
•  Information and reference: How does 
the ontology deal with information 
entities?
•  Artefacts and socially constructed 
entities: How does the ontology deal 
with artefacts (e.g. engineered items) 
and socially constructed items like 
money and laws?
Our FDM will need to select from the 
available ontological approaches to 
provide answers to these questions that 
are as comprehensive and rigorous as 
possible. These choices will need to be 
guided by the general requirements of 
the engineering domain and the domains 
engineered systems support. This 
document does not attempt to make these 
choices now.
•  A digital twin is more than just a 
collection of pieces of data that 
describes the world. How do we 
describe the relationship between a 
digital twin and the corresponding 
elementary pieces of data?
•  How do we describe the domain of 
validity of a digital twin, including any 
assumptions or simplifications of real-
world behaviour? This may include 
describing assumptions about the 
underpinning physics, engineering, 
biology or sociology that influence the 
way that the asset operates. How do 
we define the boundaries of validity of 
models to ensure that models are used 
and composed only in ways that are 
meaningful? Especially for “black box” 
models, how do we ensure the validity 
of inputs and outputs and mitigate 
the risk/damage of erroneous outputs, 
especially when users will not be close 
to the development decisions made in 
the creation of the models.
•  How will the data models used by an 
existing digital twin be validated and 
interpreted so that mappings and 
transformations can be established 
prior to seeking to integrate the twins?
•  What is the relationship between a 
twin and the physical, mathematical 
or computational model(s) that 
underpins it? How do we define the 
non-physical parameters describing 
the mathematical model used, such as 
a grid resolution?
•  What is the relationship between a 
digital twin, and the kind of things it 
describes? Is this a twin of the make 
and model of my car, or of my specific 
car? If the latter, what do we call the 
kind of thing that is a potential twin 
of all such cars, before I connect it to 
the telemetry from my specific car? 
To what extent does such telemetry 
actually need to be real-time or would 
it be sufficient to periodically collect, 
to analyse performance and arrange 
maintenance? How do we aggregate 
models that operate at very different 
tempos – from seconds, to hours to 
days?
•  How do we make statements about 
time? How do I talk about discrete 
time periods like “on Thursdays” or 
“in Summer” or “FY 20/21”? How do 
we describe and capture change 
over time? How do we model future 
operations to assess the impact of 
planned changes, without disturbing 
the current operating model?
•  How do we break down the physical 
world into parts? What is the 
relationship between a twin of a 
component of a city, such as a building, 
and a twin of a city? How do we 
reference the “coarse-graining” that 
takes place when we have different 
models, at different resolutions, that 
overlap in the aspects of the physical 
world that they describe? How do 
we aggregate models, particularly in 
circumstances where there may be 
modelling gaps? How do we deal with 
missing information, or unconnected 
assets?
•  How do we handle uncertainty? How 
should we best manage the difference 
between “measurement uncertainty”, 
“variability within a class”, “variation over 
time”, “environmental noise” and so on?
•  Some models will be mechanistic, 
based on known understanding of 
the physical world. Others will be 
purely empirical: based on maximising 
goodness-of-fit from models to 
information without incorporation of 
domain knowledge. Many will be a mix 
of these paradigms [6]. How will this 
aspect of the use of digital twins be 
reflected in the ontology? How reliable 
is each paradigm, and how can a lack 
of reliability be taken into account?
It is also worth noting that the scope of 
the data to be described covers more than 
just the digital twins themselves. Our data 
requirements also include the following:
•  How do we handle versioning? 
Should version histories be curated 
indefinitely? How do we handle 
archiving and ultimately removal of out-
of-date data?
•  How is invalid data corrected? What 
audit trail is needed and how will 
data ownership be managed and 
maintained? Are statements recorded 
together with the identity of the person 
or organisation making the claim, so 
that the provenance of information is 
tracked and unreliable information can 
be managed? How do we correctly 
handle missing, invalid or inaccurate 
data? Outlying or erroneous data 
can sometimes still be useful when 
analysed in a different way.
•  What relationships do twins have to 
their authors? Who owns them? Who 
can know what about them? What kind 
of roles and actors are there?
•  How do we describe not just the 
models themselves, but the methods 
that are used to derive insight 
from them? Models live alongside 
visualisations, interfaces, deployments 
and so on, which also need to be 
described and exchanged.
•  How do we describe the uses to which 
models have been put? Will we need 
to log each question asked of a digital 
twin? This will facilitate audit and meta-
analysis and save on computational 
time lost when re-running old studies, 
but may have information governance 
and privacy implications.
•  How do we model social concepts 
related to ownership, rights, legislation 
and regulation? What are the permitted 
uses of the model and any licence or 
usage constraints?
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Appendix B 
ISO IEC 21838-1:2019 – 
Documenting Coverage
Extract from: 2019 – ISO IEC 21838-
1:2019 – Information technology – 
Top-Level Ontologies (TLO) – Part 1:  
Requirements – Section 4.4.6: 
Documentation demonstrating 
breadth of coverage (ISO, 2019,  
sec. 4.4.6).
4.4.6  Documentation demonstrating 
breadth of coverage
4.4.6.1 Overview
The ontology documentation shall 
provide answers to the questions listed 
in subclauses 4.4.6.2 –4.4.6.16. These 
answers shall document how the TLO 
would be used in managing data of the 
types addressed in each subclause. 
(Annex C provides examples of such 
documentation.)
In some TLOs data about entities of given 
classes or types would be managed by 
using terms included in the ontology 
representing those classes or types. 
Where a TLO does not include classes 
or types that cover one or more of the 
areas identified, it shall be documented 
how it will address corresponding data, 
for example, by specifying an additional 
ontology whose relation to the TLO is 
documented.
NOTE The rationale for requiring breadth 
of coverage in a TLO is as follows. When 
an ontology-based approach is adopted, 
for example, by a large organization in 
order to promote interoperability of the 
data systems within its constituent sub-
organizations, the ontologies in question 
will be required to deal with an evolving 
collection of different sorts of data. These 
will include:
•  data that is spatially and temporally 
referenced;
•  data about entities that change over 
time;
•  data that result from assays along 
multiple qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions;
•  data reflecting mereological and 
other relations between such entities, 
including relations between entities 
and the material of which they are 
composed;
•  data about data artefacts themselves 
(for example about designs, plans, 
requirements specifications).
If it is to have a high likelihood of being 
able to serve reliably as an over-arching 
framework for the management of data 
in such circumstances – even when new 
sorts of data are being brought on stream 
– then a TLO requires a maximal breadth 
of coverage in the set of terms it includes. 
Similarly, a TLO should include relational 
expressions that enable representation of 
a broad range of relations among entities 
in its chosen categories. Various candidate 
TLOs have made different – and sometimes 
incompatible – choices concerning 
these categories and relations. To show 
conformity to this document, these choices 
shall be documented in a way that will 
justify the claim that the ontology has a 
sufficiently broad coverage of categories 
and associated relations to satisfy the 
requirements of a TLO as defined by this 
document.
4.4.6.2 Space and time
How does the ontology deal with time, 
space and spacetime?
•  Does the ontology recognize entities 
which persist in time?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
entities which occur in time?
•  Does the ontology recognize entities 
which are extended in both space and 
time?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
spatial, temporal and spatiotemporal 
regions?
4.4.6.3 Actuality and possibility
How does the ontology deal with what 
could happen or what could be the 
case, rather than what is the case or has 
happened?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
possibility?
•  Does the ontology support both 
possible and actual entities?
•  Does the ontology have a treatment of 
dispositions or tendencies?
•  Does the ontology have a way of 
dealing with merely possible or 
potential entities as might be described 
in unrealized plans or designs?
4.4.6.4 Classes and types
How does the ontology deal with issues of 
classification?
•  Does classification reflect the 
existence of certain relations of 
similarity between certain entities, or 
do classes or types exist as general 
entities in addition to particular 
instances?
•  Are classes of classes allowed?
•  Does the ontology distinguish 
between types and the classes of their 
instances?
•  Are classes or types instantiated by the 
same particulars identical?
4.4.6.5 Time and change
How does the ontology deal with time and 
change?
•  How does the ontology deal with the 
distinction between past, present and 
future entities?  How does the ontology 
deal with identity and change of 
material objects over time? How does 
the ontology deal with location, and 
with change of location?
•  Does the ontology allow for more than 
one material object to occupy exactly 
the same spatial location at the same 
time?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
changeable properties, such as being a 
student?
•  Does the ontology recognize a 
distinction between classes or types 
that apply necessarily to a particular for 
the whole of its existence, and classes 
or types that apply only temporarily?
EXAMPLES Mammal is an example of a 
class or type that applies to a particular for 
the whole of its existence. An organism is 
an example of an entity that can undergo 
change over time, such as by losing hair, 
without changing identity.
4.4.6.6  Parts, wholes, unity and 
boundaries
How does the ontology deal with relations 
of parthood?
•  If one entity is part of a second entity, 
and this entity part of a third entity, 
does it follow that the first entity is also 
part of the third entity?
•  If one entity is part of but not identical 
to a second entity, must there be 
a third entity which makes up the 
difference?
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•  How does the ontology deal with 
wholes formed through the summation 
of parts?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
continuity where a material object 
has parts between which there is no 
natural boundary?
•  How does it deal with the factor of 
unity, which obtains where the parts 
of a whole are joined together in a way 
that distinguishes it from a sum?
EXAMPLES Unity is manifested by 
organisms or planets through the relation of 
direct or indirect physical connectedness; 
unity is manifested by solar systems and 
galaxies through relations of gravity that 
are above certain thresholds. Unity is 
manifested by a married couple through 
the relation of married to, and by a group of 
siblings through the relation sibling of.
NOTE A whole manifesting the factor of 
unity can be defined as being such that all 
its parts are related to each other, and only 
to each other, by a single distinguished 
relation.
4.4.6.7 Space and place
How does the ontology deal with places 
and locations?
•  How does the ontology deal with holes, 
conduits, cavities, a vacuum?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
shape?
4.4.6.8 Scale and granularity
How does the ontology deal with scale, 
granularity and levels of reality?
•  Does the ontology treat the material 
world as being made up of entities at 
distinguished levels?
EXAMPLES Atoms, molecules, cells, 
organisms, planets and galaxies are 
examples of entities at distinguished levels 
of reality.
4.4.6.9 Qualities and other attributes
How does the ontology deal with qualities 
and other attributes?
NOTE ‘Attribute’ here is meant to include 
what are sometimes referred to as 
properties, features or characteristics.
•  How do attributes relate to the entities 
that have or bear them?
•  Does the ontology distinguish between 
attributes and values?
•  Does the ontology recognize attributes 
of attributes?
EXAMPLES Quantitative and qualitative are 
examples of attributes of attributes.
4.4.6.10  Quantities and mathematical 
entities
How does the ontology deal with 
quantitative data and with mathematical 
data and theories?
•  How does the ontology deal with units 
of measure?
•  How are those attributes which are 
represented using qualitative terms 
such as ‘hot’ or ‘elevated temperature’ 
related to attributes represented using 
quantity expressions such as ‘63 ºC’?
4.4.6.11 Processes and events
How does the ontology deal with 
processes?
•  Are processes identical to changes?
•  What kinds of processes exist?
•  Does the ontology allow attributes of 
processes?
•  Does the ontology distinguish between 
processes and states?
•  Does the ontology recognize 
instantaneous processes?
4.4.6.12 Constitution
•  How does the ontology deal with the 
relation – sometimes referred to as 
a relation of ‘constitution’ – between 
material entities and the material of 
which, at any given time, they are 
made?
•  How does the ontology deal with the 
relation between, for example, minds 
and brains, persons and organisms, or 
between organizations and the totality 
of their members?
•  Is there an analogue of the relation 
of constitution holding between 
processes, or between non-material 
entities of other sorts?
4.4.6.13 Causality
•  How does the ontology deal with 
causality?
4.4.6.14 Information and reference
•  How does the ontology deal with 
information entities?
EXAMPLES Databases, symbols, text 
documents, emails, video files, a speech.
•  Does the ontology incorporate a 
relation between an information entity 
and what the information entity is 
about?
•  If yes, how does the ontology deal 
with cases where there is no actual 
entity which a given information entity 
is about? Does the ontology deal 
with cases of this sort by recognizing 
possible worlds?
EXAMPLE Cases of aboutness where there 
is no corresponding actual entity may arise 
where plans for the future are being made.
4.4.6.15  Artefacts and socially 
constructed entities
•  How does the ontology deal with 
artefacts?
EXAMPLE Engineered items.
•  How does the ontology deal with 
entities commonly viewed as socially 
constructed, such as money?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
entities such as laws, agreements, 
duties or permissions?
4.4.6.16  Mental entities; imagined entities; 
fiction; mythology; religion
•  How does the ontology deal with 
mental entities?
EXAMPLES Minds, thoughts, decisions, 
memories, images.
•  How does the ontology deal with 
imagined entities?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
entities or data in the realm of 
mythology?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
entities or data in the realm of fiction?
•  How does the ontology deal with 
entities or data in the realm of religion?
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Appendix C 
Coverage Mapping to 
Assessment Framework
The extract from the Pathway 
requirements for a Foundation Data 
Model (Hetherington, 2020) document 
in Appendix A contains a summary 
of the coverage requirements in 
ISO IEC 21838-1:2019 – Information 
technology – Top-Level Ontologies 
(TLO) – Part 1: Requirements (ISO, 
2019) – Section 4.4.6: Documentation 
demonstrating breadth of coverage – 
extracted in Appendix B.
Table 9 maps the coverage items onto the 
items in the assessment framework.
The coverage items were designed for 
assessing the description of a single TLO 
rather than assessing a collection of the, 
so it is no surprise that the mapping is 
many to many.
Coverage Item Description Assessment Framework
Time, space and place How does the ontology deal with 
time and space-time? How does the 
ontology deal with places, locations, 








Actuality and possibility How does the ontology deal with 
what could happen or what could 
be the case, such as where multiple 
data sets give conflicting stories on 
the behaviour of a network?
Universal:
• possibilia
Conflicting datasets are 
per se an epistemic not an 
ontological matter.






•  formal generation
•  relation class-ness
universal:
•  criteria of identity




Parts, wholes, unity and 
boundaries










Scale and granularity How does the ontology deal with 
scale, resolution and granularity?
Is an epistemic concern.
Qualities and other attributes How does the ontology deal with 




Table 9 – Mapping from coverage into the framework assessment
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Quantities and mathematical 
entities
How does the ontology deal 
with quantitative data and with 
mathematical data and theories?
universal:
• materialism




Constitution How does the ontology deal with 
the relation – sometimes referred 
to as a relation of “constitution” – 
between material entities and the 








Causality How does the ontology deal with 
causality?
Low level
Information and reference How does the ontology deal with 
information entities?
Low level
Artefacts and socially 
constructed entities
How does the ontology deal with 
artefacts (e.g. engineered items) 




Candidate source top-level 
ontologies – longlist
A list (in alphabetic order) of all the 
candidate source top-level ontologies.


















CIM 1999 https://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Information_Model_(computing)
ConML+CHARM 2011 http://www.conml.org/,  
http://www.conml.org/Resources/TechSpec.aspx,  
http://www.charminfo.org/ 
COSMO not known – 
pre-2006
http://www.micra.com/,   
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#COSMO
Cyc 1984 https://www.cyc.com/the-cyc-platform,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#Cyc
DC 1995 http://dublincore.org/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dublin_Core 
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DOLCE 2019 http://www.loa.istc.cnr.it/dolce/overview.html,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#DOLCE 
EMMO 2019 (?) https://github.com/emmo-repo/EMMO,  
https://materialsmodelling.com/2019/06/14/european-materials-modelling-
ontology-emmo-release/ 
FIBO 2010 (?) https://spec.edmcouncil.org/fibo/
FrameNet 2000 (?) https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FrameNet




gist 2007 https://www.semanticarts.com/gist/, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#gist 
HQDM 2011 http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/hqdm_framework/
IDEAS 2006 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDEAS_Group, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#IDEAS 
IEC 62541 2006 https://opcfoundation.org/developer-tools/specifications-unified-
architecture,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPC_Unified_Architecture 
IEC 63088 2017 https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/30082
ISO 12006-3 2007 https://www.iso.org/standard/38706.html, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_12006 
ISO 15926-2 2003 https://www.iso.org/standard/29557.html, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_15926, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#ISO_15926 
KKO not known https://kbpedia.org/docs/kko-upper-structure/
KR Ontology 1999 http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
MarineTLO 2013 (?) https://projects.ics.forth.gr/isl/MarineTLO/, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#MarineTLO 
MIMOSA CCOM not known https://www.mimosa.org/mimosa-ccom/, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenO%26M 
OWL 2004 https://www.w3.org/OWL/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_Ontology_Language
PROTON 2005 (?) https://ontotext.com/documents/proton/Proton-Ver3.0B.pdf,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#PROTON
Schema.org 2011 https://schema.org/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schema.org
SENSUS 2001 https://www.isi.edu/natural-language/projects/ONTOLOGIES.html
SKOS 2009 https://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Knowledge_Organization_System 




TMRM late 1990s https://www.isotopicmaps.org/tmrm/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topic_map 




UMBEL 2008 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UMBEL,   
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology#UMBEL 
UML 1994 http://uml.org/,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Modeling_Language 
UMLS 1986 https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/index.html,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Medical_Language_System 





(?) is used to indicate the data is uncertain.
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Appendix E 
Selected candidate source  
top-level ontologies – details
E.1  Introduction
This appendix is intended to give 
a feel for the range of different 
approaches to top-level ontologies, 
including those that make little or no 
ontological commitment.
We provide a brief overview (usually a 
self-description) and a picture of their 
top structure, where available. We also 
include comments on key ontological 
characteristics. A selection of relevant 
extracts is included as to give more insight 
into the characteristics.
E.2 BFO – Basic Formal Ontology
E.2.1 Overview
The Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) 
framework developed by Barry Smith 
and his associates consists of a series 
of sub-ontologies at different levels of 
granularity. The ontologies are divided into 
two varieties: relating to continuant entities 
such as three-dimensional enduring 
objects, and occurrent entities (primarily) 
processes conceived as unfolding in 
successive phases through time. BFO thus 
incorporates both three-dimensionalist and 
four-dimensionalist perspectives on reality 
within a single framework. Interrelations 
are defined between the two types of 
ontologies in a way which gives BFO the 
facility to deal with both static/spatial and 
dynamic/temporal features of reality. A 
continuant domain ontology descending 
from BFO can be conceived as an inventory 
of entities existing at a time. Each 
occurrent ontology can be conceived as an 
inventory of processes unfolding through a 
given interval of time. Both BFO itself and 
each of its extension sub-ontologies can be 
conceived as a window on a certain portion 





BFO is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology.
It has an interesting horizontal stratification, 
which is documented in the journey in 
Figure 28.
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Figure 28 – BFO Stratification Journey – six strata (time indexed relations suffixed with ‘… at a time)
This shows an unusual architecture for 
spacetime. While electing to be separatist 
about space and time, the TLO also retains 
spacetime. This results in both spatial and 
temporal redundancy. Another is the single 
spatio-temporal reference frame (currently) 
– see 3.2.1 below.
Single super-sub-type parent-arity for 
universals – The monohierarchy principle 
see 2.7 below.
Possibilia: Actualist about worlds – see 3.14 
below – that is, no possible worlds. Uses 
dispositions for some aspects of modality. 
It is unclear whether it supports a full-
blown ontology of modality.
Interpenetration – for example, material 
and immaterial entities can interpenetrate – 
a person (material) can stand in a doorway 
(immaterial) – they are related by having 
overlapping spatial regions not sharing 
parts.
Mereology – own version. For example – an 
immaterial object – the hold of the ship – is 
a part of the ship, but the material objects 
in the hold are not part of it, though they 
are situated in it. Based upon Minimal 
Extensional Mereology (see below).
Extensible – currently excludes numbers.
E.2.4 Relevant extracts
These extracts from: Basic Formal Ontology 




Extract 1 – Single Inheritance
2.7 The monohierarchy principle
BFO rests on a number of heuristic 
principles that are designed to advance 
its utility to formal reasoning. These take 
the form of simple rules – analogous to 
the rules of the road – that are designed 
to promote consistency in the making of 
both domain-neutral and domain-specific 
choices in ontology construction. [19] One 
heuristic principle of this kind – expressing 
what we can think of as a principle of 
good behavior in the realm of universals 
– asserts that the asserted taxonomies of 
types and subtypes in BFO-conformant 
ontologies should be genuine trees (in the 
graph-theoretic sense), so that each node 
in the graph of universals should have at 
most one asserted is_a parent. (On the use 
of ‘asserted’ here, see [19].) This principle 
is of value not only because it supports 
a simple strategy for the formulation of 
definitions and thereby helps to prevent 
certain common kinds of error in ontology 
construction, but also because it brings 
technical benefits when ontologies are 
implemented computationally.
[19]   Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters, 
“Ontological Realism as a Methodology 
for Coordinated Evolution of Scientific 
Ontologies”, Applied Ontology, 5 
(2010), 139–188. PMC3104413
Extract 2 – Modality – Actualist
3.7.8 Material basis
Dispositions (and thus also functions) are 
introduced into BFO in order to provide a 
means for referring to what we can think 
of as the potentials or powers of things 
in the world without the need to quantify 
over putative ‘possible worlds’ or ‘possible 
objects’.
…
Extract 3 – Location – Separatist and 
Unitist
3.14 Spatiotemporal region
ELUCIDATION: A spatiotemporal region 
is an occurrent entity that is part of 
spacetime. [095-001]
‘Spacetime’ here refers to the maximal 




Given a temporal reference frame R, we 
can define ‘timeR’ as the maximal instance 
of the universal temporal region.
A survey of Top-Level Ontologies A survey of Top-Level Ontologies70 71
ELUCIDATION: A temporal region is an 
occurrent entity that is part of time 
as defined relative to some reference 
frame. [100-001]
AXIOM: Every temporal region t is such 
that t occupies_temporal_region t. 
[119-002]
AXIOM: All parts of temporal regions are 
temporal regions. [101-001]
zero-dimensional temporal region
ELUCIDATION: A zero-dimensional 
temporal region is a temporal region that 
is without extent. [102-001]
EXAMPLES: a temporal region that is 
occupied by a process boundary; right 
now; the moment at which a finger is 
detached in an industrial accident; the 




Extract 4 – Location – Reference frames
3.2.1 Excursus on frames
The four dimensions of the spacetime 
continuum are not homogeneous. Rather 
there is one time-like and three space-
like dimensions. This heterogeneity is 
sufficient, for the purposes of BFO, to 
justify our division of reality in a way that 
distinguishes spatial and temporal regions. 
In a future version, however, we will need 
to do justice to the fact that there are 
multiple ways of dividing up the spacetime 
continuum into spatial and temporal 
regions, corresponding to multiple frames 
that might be used by different observers.
…
3.6.3 Spatial region
We recommend that users of BFO region 
terms specify the coordinate frame in 
terms of which their spatial and temporal 
data are represented. When dealing with 
spatial regions on the surface of the Earth, 
for example, this will be the coordinate 
frame of latitude and longitude, potentially 
supplemented by the dimension of altitude.
…
Extract 5 – Endurantist – Occurrent 
dependence on Continuants
3.7.2 No s-dependence of higher order
BFO does not recognize universals of 
higher order (for example, the universal 
universal). All universals are instantiated by 
instance entities which are not universals.
Extract 6 – Mereology – Minimal 
Extensional Mereology
3 Specification
3.1 Relations of parthood
As our starting point in understanding the 
parthood relation, we take the axioms of 
Minimal Extensional Mereology as defined 
by Simons [46, pp. 26-31], assuming, with 




Business Objects Reference Ontology is an 
upper ontology designed for developing 
ontological or semantic models for large 
complex operational applications that 
consists of a top-level ontology as well as 
a process for constructing the ontology. It 
is built upon a series of clear metaphysical 
choices to provide a solid (metaphysical) 
foundation. A key choice was for an 
extensional (and hence, four-dimensional) 
ontology which provides it with a simple 
criteria of identity. Elements of it have 
appeared in a number of standards. For 
example, the ISO standard, ISO 15926 
– Industrial automation systems and 
integration – was heavily influenced by 
an early version. The IDEAS (International 
Defence Enterprise Architecture 
Specification for exchange) standard is 
based upon BORO, which in turn was used 
to develop DODAF 2.0.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BORO
See also: https://www.borosolutions.net/, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BORO.
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E.3.2 Top-level
E.3.3 Key characteristics
BORO is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology. It is an extensional 
ontology with a general unifying approach – 
illustrated in the journey in Figure 29.
Figure 29 – BORO Stratification Journey – one stratum
Unlike most other TLOs BORO has a 
position on the Indexicals for ‘here’ and 
‘now’. See Business objects: re-engineering 
for re-use. Chapter 8 – Section 4 (Partridge, 
1996) – The time-based ‘consciousness’ 
of information systems – which discusses 
a ‘now’ and ‘here’ object. In a later paper, 
a more sophisticated way of handling 
indexicality using agentology is described 
(Partridge, 2018). The paper suggests that 
there is an agentology layer indexed to the 
agent/system under the ontology.
Unlike most other TLOs it has a clearly 
documented position on the unstratified 
type-instance hierarchy. See Developing 
an Ontological Sandbox: Investigating 
Multi-Level Modelling’s Possible 
Metaphysical Structures (Partridge, 2017) 
and Coordinate Systems: Level Ascending 
Ontological Options for a detailed 
discussion (Partridge, 2019).
E.3.4 Relevant extracts
These extracts from: BORO as a Foundation 
to Enterprise Ontology - https://www.
academia.edu/33717627/.
BORO includes a foundational (or upper) 
ontology and a closely intertwined 
methodology for information systems 
(IS) re-engineering (Partridge, 1996), 
hence the term BORO refers to both the 
ontology and the methodology. BORO 
was originally conceived in the late 
1980s to address a particular need for a 
solid legacy re-engineering process and 
then evolved to address a wider need 
for developing enterprise systems in 
a ‘better way’; in other words in a way 
that was less cumbersome, compared to 
the heavyweight methodologies of the 
time, enabling higher levels of reuse and, 
as a consequence, capable of reducing 
the effort and cost of (re-)developing, 
maintaining and interoperating enterprise 
systems. It was eventually publicly 
documented in (Partridge, 1996).
The BORO Foundational Ontology is 
strongly rooted in philosophical ontology. 
Ontology is defined by Jonathan Lowe 
as “the set of things whose existence 
is acknowledged by a particular theory 
or system of thought” (Honderich, 2006, 
670). This definition is particularly relevant 
in the context of enterprise modeling and 
systems development since it grounds 
ontology in reality (i.e. “the things whose 
existence is acknowledged”) rather than 
one’s subjective conception of what 
constitutes the real world. As such BORO is 
a realist ontology, one that recognizes the 
existence of an objective reality.
…
In the BUML model of Figure 1 Objects 
represents the three top level BORO 
categories: Elements, Types and tuples. 
Every object belongs to one and only 
one of the three categories which are 
framed, as mentioned earlier, by a range of 
metaphysical choices. These choices mean 
that, within BORO, each category has its 
own identity criteria.
•  Elements are individual objects whose 
identity is given by the element’s 
spatiotemporal extent (or extension); 
i.e. the space and time it occupies. 
BORO simplifies things by assuming 
that matter and space-time are 
identical (this is a metaphysical 
stance that has been called super-
substantivalism (Sklar, 1974; Schaffer, 
2009). An example of an element would 
be the person John.
•  Types are collections of any type of 
object (in other words, objects of any 
of the three categories). The identity of 
a type is determined by its extension, 
the collection of its instances (i.e. 
members). For example, the extension 
of the type Persons is the set of all 
people. In BORO, Types play a similar 
role to universals in other foundational 
ontologies.
•  Tuples are relationships between 
objects. The identity of a tuple is 
defined by the places in the tuple. 
An example is (Mary, John) in which 
the elements Mary and John occupy 
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places 1 and 2 in the tuple respectively. 
Tuples can be collected into types, 
called tuple types. An example is 
parentOf, which is the collection of all 
relationships between parents and their 
children. Section 2.3 will describe tuple 
types and their top level patterns in 
more detail.
There is a system of ontological 
dependence relations between these 
categories. One rather abstract way of 
developing an understanding of these, 
and so developing a better understanding 
of the categories is through grounding 
(Fine, 2010), which provides a kind of 
ontogenesis narrative for the objects in 
the ontology. The grounding (ontogenesis) 
narrative starts with a single element, the 
pluriverse of all possible worlds (a position 
Schaffer (2010) calls ‘priority monism’). 
Consider the generative operation of 
decomposition that divides an element 
into all its parts. If we apply this to the 
pluriverse we then have all the elements.
This operation exhausts all elements as 
the pluriverse and its parts are all the 
elements. Then consider the generative 
type-builder operation; we can then apply 
this to the (previously generated) elements 
to build the type Elements; this is the 
ontological category of Elements. Then 
consider the generative operation power-
type-builder (power-types are described in 
more detail below). Apply the powertype-
builder operation to the set Elements – this 
builds the type that has all the subsets 
of Elements as its members. Applying the 
power type-builder operation repeatedly 
builds a type hierarchy. Finally, consider 
the generative tuple-builder operation, 
this takes a number of any type of object, 
including tuples, and organizes them into a 
tuple. This grounding approach is reflected 
in the BORO methodology. An example is 
provided in Partridge (2002a).
E.4 CIDOC
E.4.1 Overview
Although “CIDOC object-oriented 
Conceptual Reference Model” (CRM) is 
a domain ontology, specialised to the 
purposes of representing cultural heritage, 
a subset called CRM Core is a generic 
upper ontology, including:
•  Space-Time – title/identifier, place, 
era/period, time-span, relationship to 
persistent items
•  Events – title/identifier, beginning/
ending of existence, participants 
(people, either individually or in 
groups), creation/modification of things 
(physical or conceptional), relationship 
to persistent items
•  Material Things – title/identifier, place, 
the information object the material 
thing carries, part-of relationships, 
relationship to persistent items
•  Immaterial Things – title/identifier, 
information objects (propositional or 
symbolic), conceptional things, part-of 
relationships
A persistent item is a physical or 
conceptional item that has a persistent 
identity recognized within the duration 
of its existence by its identification rather 
than by its continuity or by observation. 
A persistent item is comparable to an 
endurant.
A propositional object is a set of 
statements about real or imaginary things.
A symbolic object is a sign/symbol or an 




See also: http://www.cidoc-crm.org/, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIDOC_
Conceptual_Reference_Model
Also ISO 21127:2014 Information and 
documentation – A reference ontology 
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E.4.3 Key characteristics
CIDOC is a lightweight foundational 
ontology. It does not have much 
documentation of its ontological 
commitments.
E.4.4 Relevant extracts
These extracts from: ISO 21127:2014 
Information and documentation – A 
reference ontology for the interchange of 
cultural heritage information – https://www.
iso.org/standard/57832.html.
3.1 – class – category of items that share 
one or more common traits.
(Hence, intensional criterion of identity)
3.11 – multiple inheritance – possibility for 
a class to have more than one immediate 
superclass
E77 Persistent Item – Scope note: This 
class comprises items that have a 
persistent identity, sometimes known as 
“endurants” in philosophy. They can be 
repeatedly recognized within the duration 
of their existence by identity criteria 
rather than by continuity or observation. 
Persistent Items can be either physical 
entities, such as people, animals, or things; 
or conceptual entities, such as ideas, 
concepts, products of the imagination, or 
common names. … The main classes of 
objects that fall outside the scope of the 
E77 Persistent Item class are temporal 





The Common Information Model (CIM) 
is an open standard that defines how 
managed elements in an IT environment 
are represented as a common set of 
objects and relationships between them. 
The Distributed Management Task Force 
maintains the CIM to allow consistent 
management of these managed elements, 
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E.5.2 Top-level
E.5.3 Key characteristics
CIM is a generic top-level data model. It 
has few, if any, foundational ontological 
commitments). It is understandably domain 
focussed.
E.6  ConML + CHARM – 
Conceptual Modelling 
Language and Cultural 
Heritage Abstract Reference 
Model
E.6.1 Overview
ConML is a conceptual modelling language 
that has been constructed from scratch 
with three major goals in mind:
 -  Ease of use for non-experts in 
information technologies.
 -  Simplicity.
 -  Expressiveness in complex domains, 
such as those in the humanities
 -  Capturing “soft” issues such 
as temporality, subjectivity and 
vagueness.
CHARM is a cultural heritage abstract 
reference model that extends ConML.
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E.6.3 Key characteristics
ConML(+CHARM) is a lightweight 
foundational ontology. It has few 
foundational ontological commitments.
The combined ontology is focussed on its 
domain.
E.7 COSMO – COmmon Semantic 
MOdel
E.7.1 Overview
Developed with the goal of developing 
a foundation ontology that can serve 






Taken from  
http://micra.com/COSMO/COSMO.owl.
A survey of Top-Level Ontologies A survey of Top-Level Ontologies82 83
E.8 Cyc
E.8.1 Overview
Cyc is a long-term artificial intelligence 
project that aims to assemble a 
comprehensive ontology and knowledge 
base that spans the basic concepts and 
rules about how the world works. Hoping 
to capture common sense knowledge, Cyc 
focuses on implicit knowledge that other 
AI platforms may take for granted. This 
is contrasted with facts one might find 
somewhere on the internet or retrieve 
via a search engine or Wikipedia. Cyc 
enables AI applications to perform human-
like reasoning and be less “brittle” when 
confronted with novel situations.
The first version of OpenCyc was released 
in spring 2002 and contained only 6,000 
concepts and 60,000 facts. The knowledge 






The developers of Cyc did not believe 
that the top-most levels of the ‘ontology’ 
mattered a great deal. They thought 
the hard work is done lower down. And 
so, their top-level is very simple – with 
no real explicit foundational ontological 
commitments.
Cyc allows multiple inheritance (multiple 
is-a parents): for example, Intangible Stuff 
has Intangible Object and Stuff as parents. 
It uses Collection for higher order types.
E.8.3 Key characteristics




E.9 DC – Dublin Core
E.9.1 Overview
The Dublin Core schema is a small set 
of vocabulary terms that can be used to 
describe digital resources (video, images, 
web pages, etc.), as well as physical 






Figure 1 – the DCMI resource model
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Figure 2 – the DCMI description set model 
From https://www.dublincore.org/specifications/dublin-core/abstract-model/.
E.9.3 Key characteristics





Extract 1 – The DCMI Vocabulary Model
2.3 The DCMI Vocabulary Model
The abstract model of the vocabularies 
used in DC metadata descriptions is as 
follows:
•  A vocabulary is a set of one or more 
terms. Each term is a member of one or 
more vocabularies.
•  A term is a property (element), class, 
vocabulary encoding scheme, or syntax 
encoding scheme.
•  Each property may be related to one 
or more classes by a has domain 
relationship. Where it is stated that a 
property has such a relationship with 
a class and the property is part of a 
property/value pair, it follows that the 
described resource is an instance of 
that class.
•  Each property may be related to 
one or more classes by a has range 
relationship. Where it is stated that a 
property has such a relationship with 
a class and the property is part of a 
property/value pair, it follows that the 
value is an instance of that class.
•  Each resource may be an instance of 
one or more classes.
•  Each resource may be a member of 
one or more vocabulary encoding 
schemes.
Each class may be related to one or more 
other classes by a sub-class of relationship 
(where the two classes are defined such 
that all resources that are instances of the 
sub-class are also instances of the related 
class).
Each property may be related to one or 
more other properties by a sub-property 
of relationship. Where it is stated that such 
a relationship exists, the two properties 
are defined such that whenever the sub-
property is part of a property/value pair 
describing a resource, it follows that 
the resource is also described using a 
second property/value pair made up of the 
property and the value.
Each syntax encoding scheme is a class (of 
literals).
Note that the word “vocabulary” is used 
here to refer specifically to a set of terms, 
a set in which the members are properties 
(elements), classes, vocabulary encoding 
schemes, and/or syntax encoding schemes.
Figure 3 – the DCMI vocabulary model
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E.10 DOLCE – Descriptive 
Ontology for Linguistic and 
Cognitive Engineering
E.10.1 Overview
Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and 
Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) is a 
foundational ontology designed in 2002 in 
the context of the WonderWeb EU project, 
developed by Nicola Guarino and his 
associates at the Laboratory for Applied 
Ontology (LOA). As implied by its acronym, 
DOLCE is oriented toward capturing the 
ontological categories underlying natural 
language and human common sense. 
DOLCE, however, does not commit to a 
strictly referentialist metaphysics related 
to the intrinsic nature of the world. Rather, 
the categories it introduces are thought of 
as cognitive artifacts, which are ultimately 
depending on human perception, cultural 
inprints, and social conventions. In this 
sense, they intend to be just descriptive 
(vs prescriptive) notions, which support 







The top object is labelled ‘Particular’ 
indicating that all instances of this and its 
sub-types are particulars. One implication 
of this is that the ontology is first order – 
that there are no higher order ontologies.
E.10.3 Key characteristics
DOLCE is a well-documented heavyweight 
natural language ontology aiming to 
capture the ontological categories 






The EMMO top-level is the group of 
fundamental axioms that constitute the 
philosophical foundation of the EMMO. 
Adopting a physicalistic/nominalistic 
perspective, the EMMO defines real world 
objects as 4D objects that are always 
extended in space and time (i.e. real-
world objects cannot be spaceless nor 
timeless). For this reason, abstract objects, 
i.e. objects that do not extend in space 
and time, are forbidden in the EMMO. It 
has been instigated by materials science 
and provides the connection between 
the physical world, the experimental 
world (materials characterisation) and the 
simulation world (materials modelling).












The Reductionistic perspective class uses 
the fundamental non-transitive parthood 
relation, called direct parthood, to provide 
a powerful granularity description of 
multiscale real world objects. The EMMO 
can in principle represents the Universe 
with direct parthood relations as a 
direct rooted tree up to its elementary 
constituents.
The Holistic perspective class introduces 
the concept of real world objects that 
unfold in time in a way that has a meaning 
for the EMMO user, through the definition 
of the classes Process and Participant.
The Phenomenic perspective class 
introduces the concept of real world 
objects that express of a recognisable 
pattern in space or time that impress 
the user. Under this class the EMMO 
categorises e.g. formal languages, pictures, 
geometry, mathematics and sounds. 
Phenomenic objects can be used in a 
semiotic process as signs.
The Physics perspective class introduces 
the concept of real world objects that have 
a meaning for the under applied physics 
perspective.
The semiotics module introduces the 
concepts of semiotics and the Semiosis 
process that has a Sign, an Object and an 
Interpreter as participants. This forms the 
basis in EMMO to represent e.g. models, 
formal languages, theories, information and 
properties.
EMMO relations
All EMMO relations are subrelations of 
the relations found in the two roots: 
mereotopological and semiotical. The 
relation hierarchy extends more vertically 
(i.e. more subrelations) than horizontally 
(i.e. less sibling relations), facilitating 
the categorisation and inferencing of 
individuals.
Imposing all relations to fall under 
mereotopology or semiotics is how the 
EMMO force the developers to respect its 
perspectives. Two entities are related only 
by contact or parthood (mereotopology) or 
by standing one for another (semiosis): no 
other types of relation are possible within 
the EMMO.
E.12  FIBO – Financial Industry 
Business Ontology
E.12.1 Overview
The Financial Industry Business Ontology 
(FIBO) defines the sets of things that are of 
interest in financial business applications 
and the ways that those things can relate 
to one another.
From https://spec.edmcouncil.org/fibo/
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E.12.2 Top-level
E.12.3 Key characteristics
We were unable to find adequate resources 
to assess this TLO.
E.13 FrameNet
E.13.1 Overview
In computational linguistics, FrameNet 
is a project housed at the International 
Computer Science Institute in Berkeley, 
California which produces an electronic 
resource based on a theory of meaning 
called frame semantics. FrameNet reveals 
for example that the sentence “John sold 
a car to Mary” essentially describes the 
same basic situation (semantic frame) 
as “Mary bought a car from John”, just 
from a different perspective. A semantic 
frame can be thought of as a conceptual 
structure describing an event, relation, 
or object and the participants in it. The 
FrameNet lexical database contains over 
1,200 semantic frames, 13,000 lexical 
units (a pairing of a word with a meaning; 
polysemous words are represented by 
several lexical units) and 202,000 example 
sentences. FrameNet is largely the creation 
of Charles J. Fillmore, who developed the 
theory of frame semantics that the project 
is based on, and was initially the project 






FrameNet has noted several broad 
categories, including Event, Relation, State, 
Entity, Locale, and Process. Many frames 
inherit from these “top-level” categories, 
and from those inherited frames, many 
frames are related via relationships such 
as Using, Precedes, Subframe, etc. Further 
effort has extracted potential “top-level” 
frames which do not inherit from any 
other frames. These potential “top-level” 
frames (and all related frames) have been 
gathered as smaller groups. Finally, frames 





A natural language ontology.
E.14 GFO – General Formal 
Ontology
E.14.1 Overview
Realistic ontology integrating processes 
and objects. It attempts to include many 
aspects of recent philosophy, which is 
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E.14.2 Top-level
E.14.3 Key characteristics
GFO is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology.
E.14.4 Relevant Extracts
From General Formal Ontology (GFO) – Part 
I: Basic Principles – Version 1.0 – No. 8 – 
July 2006
Extract 1 – Higher order
14.3 Instantiation and Categories
… Since we assume categories of arbitrary 
(finite) type, there can be arbitrarily 
long (finite) chains of iteration of the 
instantiation relation.
Extract 2 – First order – apart from one 
exception – persistants, a special category 
of second order
3.4 Basic Level
The basic level of GFO contains all relevant 
top-level distinctions and categories. One 
should distinguish between primitive 
categories (whose instances are 
individuals), and higher order categories. 
In the present document we consider 
primitive categories and the category of 
persistants (which is a special category 
of second order). These categories will 
be extended in the future using a number 
of non-primitive categories. Primitive 
categories and persistants of the basic 
level will be discussed further in the 
following sections and are the main content 
of the current report.
E.15 gist
E.15.1 Overview
gist is developed and supported by 
Semantic Arts. gist (not an acronym 
– it means to get the essence of) is a 
“minimalist upper ontology”. gist is targeted 
at enterprise information systems, although 
it has been applied to healthcare delivery 
applications. The major attributes of gist 
are:
 -  it is small (there are 140 classes and 
127 properties)
 -  it is comprehensive (most enterprises 
will not find the need to create 
additional primitive classes, but will 
find that most of their classes can be 
defined and derived from gist)
 -  it is robust – all the classes descend 
from 12 primitive classes, which are 
mostly mutually disjoint. This aids 
a great deal in subsequent error 
detection. There are 1342 axioms, and 
it uses almost all of the DL constructs 
(it is SROIQ(D))
 -  it is concrete – most upper ontologies 
start with abstract philosophical 
concepts that users must commit 
to in order to use the ontology. Gist 
starts with concrete classes that most 
people already do, or reasonably 
could agree with, such as Person, 
Organization, Document, Time, 
UnitOfMeasure and the like)
 -  it is unambiguous – ambiguous terms 
(such as “term”) have been removed 
as they are often overloaded and 
confused. Also terms that frequently 
have different definitions at different 
enterprises (such as customer and 
order) have been removed, also to 
reduce ambiguity.
 -  it is understandable – in addition to 
being built on concrete, generally 
understood primitives, it is extremely 
modular. The 140 classes are 
implemented in 18 modular ontologies, 
each can easily be understood in its 
entirety, and each imports only the 
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E.15.2 Top-level E.15.3 Key characteristics
gist is a generic TLO. It clearly states 
it intentionally has few ontological 
commitments.
E.15.4 Relevant Extracts
Extract 1 – Avoids “abstract philosophical 
concepts”
“it is concrete – most upper ontologies 
start with abstract philosophical concepts 
that users must commit to in order to use 
the ontology. Gist starts with concrete 
classes that most people already do, or 
reasonably could agree with, such as 
Person, Organization, Document, Time, 
UnitOfMeasure and the like)”
Extract 2 – “Gist has extensive and fine 
grained disjointness at the highest level.”
“Gist has a small number of top level 
concepts from which everything else 
derives. And these concepts are not 
philosophical abstractions like endurants 
and perdurants, or qualia, they are normal 
terms whose definitions are quite close to 
what you already believe.
Gist has extensive and fine grained 
disjointness at the highest level. It turns 
out that in order for an upper ontology to 
help you avoid making logical errors in your 
derived enterprise or application ontology, 
it needs to make use of disjointness.  
Without disjointness, the reasoner does not 
find logic errors.”
E.16  HQDM – High Quality Data 
Models
E.16.1 Overview
The High Quality Data Models (HQDM) 
Framework is a four-dimensional top-level 
ontology with extensional identity criteria 
that aims to support large scale data 
integration. As such it aims to ensure there 
is consistency among data created using 
the framework. The HQDM Framework is 
based on work developing and using ISO 
15926 and lessons learnt from BORO, which 
influenced ISO 19526-2.
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E.16.2 Top-level
E.16.3 Key characteristics
This is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology. It is an extensional 
ontology with a general unifying approach 
– illustrated in the journey in Figure 30. It 
draws heavily on ISO 15926-2 – and shares 
some of its technical background.
It introduces some novel ideas – such as 
interpreting possible worlds as branching.
E.16.4 Relevant extracts
Nothing added yet.
Figure 30 – HQDM Stratification Journey – one stratum




The upper ontology developed by the 
IDEAS Group is higher-order, extensional 
and 4D. It was developed using the 
BORO Method. The IDEAS ontology is 
not intended for reasoning and inference 
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E.17.3 Key characteristics
This is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology. It is an extensional 
ontology with a general unifying approach 
– illustrated in the journey in Figure 31. It is 





OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is 
a machine to machine communication 
protocol for industrial automation 
developed by the OPC Foundation.
•  Focus on communicating with industrial 
equipment and systems for data 
collection and control
•  Open – freely available and 
implementable under GPL 2.0 license
•  Cross-platform – not tied to one 
operating system or programming 
language
•  Service-oriented architecture (SOA)
•  Inherent complexity – the specification 
consists of 1250 pages in 14 
documents
•  Offers security functionality for 
authentication, authorization, integrity 
and confidentiality
•  Integral information model, which is 
the foundation of the infrastructure 
necessary for information integration 
where vendors and organizations can 
model their complex data into an OPC 
UA namespace to take advantage of 
the rich service-oriented architecture 
of OPC UA. There are over 35 
collaborations with the OPC Foundation 
currently. Key industries include 
pharmaceutical, oil and gas, building 
automation, industrial robotics, security, 







ISO Standard document not available.
E.19 IEC 63088
E.19.1 Overview
IEC PAS 63088:2017(E) describes a 
reference architecture model in the form of 
a cubic layer model, which shows technical 
objects (assets) in the form of layers, and 
allows them to be described, tracked 
over their entire lifetime (or “vita”) and 
assigned to technical and/or organizational 
hierarchies. It also describes the structure 
and function of Industry 4.0 components as 





ISO Standard document not available.




ISO 12006-3:2007 specifies a language-
independent information model which 
can be used for the development of 
dictionaries used to store or provide 
information about construction works. It 
enables classification systems, information 
models, object models and process models 








This is a generic top-level data model
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E.21 ISO 15926-2
E.21.1 Overview
ISO 15926-2:2003 specifies a conceptual 
data model for computer representation of 
technical information about process plants. 
[A] generic 4D model that can support all 
disciplines, supply chain company types 
and life cycle stages, regarding information 
about functional requirements, physical 
solutions, types of objects and individual 







This is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology. It is an extensional 
ontology with a general unifying approach 
– illustrated in the journey in Figure 32. It is 
an ISO standard, whose development was 
partly influenced by the BORO.
It was developed in the 1990s using the 
EXPRESS data modelling language and 
it includes a meta-model to support the 
implementation of an RDL to enable domain 
ontologies to be developed in data as 
extensions.
ISO 15926-2:2003(E)
Figure 32 –  ISO 15926 Stratification Journey – 
one stratum
E.22 KKO: KBpedia Knowledge 
Ontology
E.22.1 Overview
KBpedia is a comprehensive knowledge 
structure for promoting data 
interoperability and knowledge-based 
artificial intelligence, or KBAI. The KBpedia 
knowledge structure combines seven 
‘core’ public knowledge bases – Wikipedia, 
Wikidata, schema.org, DBpedia, GeoNames, 
OpenCyc, and standard UNSPSC products 
and services – into an integrated whole. 
KBpedia’s upper structure, or knowledge 
graph, is the KBpedia Knowledge Ontology. 
We base KKO on the universal categories 
and knowledge representation insights of 
the great 19th century American logician, 
polymath and scientist, Charles Sanders 
Peirce. The upper structure of the KBpedia 
Knowledge Ontology (KKO) is informed by 
the triadic logic and universal categories 
of Charles Sanders Peirce. This trichotomy, 
also the basis for his views on semiosis (or 
the nature of signs), was in Peirce’s view 
the most primitive or reduced manner by 
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E.22.2 Top-level E.22.3 Key characteristics
This is a natural language ontology 
influenced by Charles Peirce.
E.23 KR Ontology – Knowledge 
Representation Ontology
E.23.1 Overview
The KR Ontology is defined in the book 
Knowledge Representation by John F. 
Sowa. Its categories have been derived 
from a synthesis of various sources, 
but the two major influences are the 
semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
the categories of existence of Alfred 
North Whitehead. The primitive categories 
are: Independent, Relative, or Mediating; 






KR is a heavyweight foundational ontology 
influenced by Charles Peirce.
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E.24 MarineTLO: A Top-Level  
Ontology for the Marine Domain
E.24.1 Overview
Is a top-level  ontology, generic enough 
to provide consistent abstractions or 
specifications of concepts included in 
all data models or ontologies of marine 
data sources and provide the necessary 
properties to make this distributed 
knowledge base a coherent source of 
facts relating observational data with the 
respective spatiotemporal context and 






The model is formulated as an object-
oriented semantic model, hence it has 
meta-class and class levels, as shown 
below.
The first broad division into persistent 
items and temporal phenomenon, looks 
similar to the endurantist’s continuant and 
occurrent distinction.
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E.24.3 Key characteristics
Appears to have a lightweight top-level – 
with few ontological commitments.
Possibly an endurantist commitment.
E.24.4 Excerpts
“Formulation – It is an object-oriented 
semantic model, expressed to a form 
comprehensible to both documentation 
experts and information scientists while 
readily can be converted to machine-
readable formats such as RDF Schema, 
OWL, etc”
E.25 MIMOSA CCOM – (Common 
Conceptual Object Model)
E.25.1 Overview
MIMOSA CCOM (Machinery Information 
Management Open Systems Alliance – 
Common Conceptual Object Model) serves 
as an information model for the exchange 
of asset information. Its core mission is to 
facilitate standards-based interoperability 
between systems: providing an XML model 








A generic data model with no explicit top-
level ontological commitment.
Note the significant number of higher order 
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E.26 OWL – Web Ontology 
Language
E.26.1 Overview
The Web Ontology Language (OWL) is 
a family of knowledge representation 
languages for authoring ontologies. 
Ontologies are a formal way to describe 
taxonomies and classification networks, 
essentially defining the structure of 
knowledge for various domains: the nouns 
representing classes of objects and the 




A generic top-level data model with a 
lightweight (or no) foundational ontological 
commitments.
E.27 ProtOn – PROTo ONtology
E.27.1 Overview
PROTON (PROTo ONtology) is a basic 
subsumption hierarchy which provides 
coverage of most of the upper-level 
concepts necessary for semantic 
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E.27.3 Key characteristics




Extract 1 – Design principles
The PROTON ontology contains about 
500 classes and 150 properties, providing 
coverage of
the general concepts necessary for a 
wide range of tasks, including semantic 
annotation,
indexing, and retrieval. The design 
principles can be summarized as follows:
•  domain-independence;
•  lightweight logical definitions;
•  alignment with popular metadata 
standards;
•  good coverage of named entity types 
and concrete domains (i.e. modelling of 
concepts such as people, organizations, 
locations, numbers, dates, addresses, 
etc.); and
•  good coverage of instance data in 
Linked Open Data Reasonable view 
Fact Forge.
The ontology is encoded in a fragment 
of OWL Lite and split into four modules: 
System, Top,
Extent, and KM (Knowledge Management). 
A snapshot of the PROTON class hierarchy 
is
given on Figure 1, showing the Top and the 
Extent modules.
Extract 2 – PROTON is relatively un-
restrictive
1. Design Rationales
PROTON is designed as a lightweight 
upper-level ontology for use in Knowledge
Management and Semantic Web 
applications. The above mission statement 
has two important
implications:
•  PROTON is relatively un-restrictive. It 
specifies only a hierarchy of classes 
and domain and range of properties 
defined within it, but it does not impose 
any other restrictions on the meaning 
of the classes and properties.
•  PROTON is not precise in some 
aspects, for instance regarding the 
conceptualization of space and time. 
This is partly because proper models 
for these aspects would require using a 
logical apparatus, which is beyond the 
limits acceptable for many of the tasks 
to which we wish to apply PROTON 
(e.g. queries and management of huge 
datasets/knowledge bases); and partly 
because it is very hard to craft strict 
and precise conceptualizations for 
these concepts, which are adequate 




Schema.org is a collaborative, community 
activity with a mission to create, maintain, 
and promote schemas for structured data 

















A generic top-level data model with 





Extract 1 – Data Model Design
The data model used is very generic and 
derived from RDF Schema (which in turn 
was derived from CycL, see History section 
for details ...).
1.  We have a set of types, arranged in a 
multiple inheritance hierarchy where 
each type may be a sub-class of 
multiple types.
2.  We have a set of properties:
1.  each property may have one 
or more types as its domains. 
The property may be used for 
instances of any of these types.
2.  each property may have one or 
more types as its ranges. The 
value(s) of the property should be 
instances of at least one of these 
types.
The decision to allow multiple domains 
and ranges was purely pragmatic. While 
the computational properties of systems 
with a single domain and range are easier 
to understand, in practice, this forces the 
creation of a lot of artifical types, which are 
there purely to act as the domain/range of 
some properties.
Like many other systems, the schema 
presented here can be extended (with a 
few types like Class and Property and a 
few properties like domainIncludes and 
rangeIncludes) to allow for reflection, i.e., 
for the schema to be represented in terms 
of itself.
Extract 2 – Not intended to be a ‘global 
ontology’
The type hierarchy presented on this site 
is not intended to be a ‘global ontology’ 
of the world. When founded in 2011 it 
was strictly focussed around the types of 
entities for which the project’s founders 
(Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google and Yandex), 
could reasonably expect to provide some 
special treatment for via search engines. 
As the project has evolved, introducing 
more community collaboration and 
extension mechanisms, its scope has 
expanded gradually. However it is still the 
case that schema.org is not intended as a 
universal ontology. We expect it to be used 
alongside other vocabulary that shares our 
basic datamodel and our use of underlying 
standards like JSON-LD, Microdata and 
RDFa
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E.29 SENSUS
E.29.1 Overview
We have constructed SENSUS, a 70,000-
node terminology taxonomy, as a 
framework into which additional knowledge 











SKOS is an area of work developing 
specifications and standards to support 
the use of knowledge organization systems 
(KOS) such as thesauri, classification 
schemes, subject heading systems and 







The principal element categories of SKOS 
are concepts, labels, notations, semantic 
relations, mapping properties, and 
collections. The associated concepts are 
listed in the table below.
SKOS Vocabulary Organized by Theme







Concept prefLabel note broader broadMatch Collection
ConceptScheme altLabel changeNote narrower narrowMatch orderedCollection
inScheme hiddenLabel definition related relatedMatch member
hasTopConcept notation editorialNote broaderTransitive closeMatch memberList





A natural language ontology that has a 




Extract 1 – Similar structure to thesauri, etc.
Many knowledge organization systems, 
such as thesauri, taxonomies, classification 
schemes and subject heading systems, 
share a similar structure, and are used in 
similar applications. SKOS captures much 
of this similarity and makes it explicit, to 
enable data and technology sharing across 
diverse applications.
Extract 2 – Higher order concepts
9. Concept Collections
9.1. Preamble
SKOS concept collections are labeled and/
or ordered groups of SKOS concepts.
Collections are useful where a group of 
concepts shares something in common, 
and it is convenient to group them under 
a common label, or where some concepts 
can be placed in a meaningful order.
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E.31 SUMO
E.31.1 Overview
Is an upper ontology intended as a 
foundation ontology for a variety of 
computer information processing systems. 
SUMO defines a hierarchy of classes and 
related rules and relationships. These are 
expressed in a version of the language 
SUO-KIF which has a LISP-like syntax. 
A mapping from WordNet synsets to 
SUMO has been defined. Initially, SUMO 
was focused on meta-level concepts 
(general entities that do not belong to a 
specific problem domain), and thereby 
would lead naturally to a categorization 
scheme for encyclopedias. It has now 
been considerably expanded to include 
a mid-level ontology and dozens of 
domain ontologies. SUMO is organized for 










A natural language ontology that supports 
higher order types (see ‘class’ and ‘set’ 
below)
E.31.4 Relevant Extracts
Extract 1 – Collection, Class and Set
(documentation Collection 
EnglishLanguage “Collections have 
members like Classes, but, unlike Classes, 
they have a position in space-time and 
members can be added and subtracted 
without thereby changing the identity of 
the Collection. Some examples are toolkits, 
football teams, and flocks of sheep.”)
(documentation Class EnglishLanguage 
“Classes differ from Sets in three important 
respects. First, Classes are not assumed 
to be extensional. That is, distinct Classes 
might well have exactly the same instances. 
Second, Classes typically have an 
associated `condition’ that determines the 
instances of the Class. So, for example, the 
condition `human’ determines the Class 
of Humans. Note that some Classes might 
satisfy their own condition (e.g., the Class 
of Abstract things is Abstract) and hence 
be instances of themselves. Third, the 
instances of a class may occur only once 
within the class, i.e. a class cannot contain 
duplicate instances.”)
(documentation Set EnglishLanguage “A 
SetOrClass that satisfies extensionality 
as well as other constraints specified by 
some choice of set theory. Sets differ from 
Classes in two important respects. First, 
Sets are extensional – two Sets with the 
same elements are identical. Second, a Set 
can be an arbitrary stock of objects. That 
is, there is no requirement that Sets have 
an associated condition that determines 
their membership. Note that Sets are not 
assumed to be unique sets, i.e. elements 
of a Set may occur more than once in the 
Set.”)
NB: Collections of collections are fusion 
of their members and so do not ascend a 
type.
E.32 TMRM/TMDM – Topic Map 
Reference/Data Models
Overview
A topic map is a standard for the 
representation and interchange of 
knowledge, with an emphasis on the 
findability of information. Topic maps were 
originally developed in the late 1990s 
as a way to represent back-of-the-book 
index structures so that multiple indexes 
from different sources could be merged. 
However, the developers quickly realized 
that with a little additional generalization, 
they could create a meta-model with 
potentially far wider application. The ISO 
standard is formally known as ISO/IEC 
13250:2003.
A topic map represents information using
•  topics, representing any concept, from 
people, countries, and organizations to 
software modules, individual files, and 
events,
•  associations, representing hypergraph 
relationships between topics, and
•  occurrences, representing information 
resources relevant to a particular topic.
Topic maps are similar to concept maps 
and mind maps in many respects, though 
only topic maps are ISO standards. 
Topic maps are a form of semantic web 





html (ISO/IEC 13250-5:2015 Information 
technology – Topic Maps – Part 5: 
Reference model), https://www.
isotopicmaps.org/sam/sam-model/ (Topic 
Maps – Data Model)
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E.32.1 Top-level E.32.2 Key characteristics
A generic ontology with little ontological 
commitment. Allows higher order levels. 
Potentially non-well bounded (no notion 
of particulars). Instantiation is possibly 
gunky and junky across topics.  Sub-class 
is possibly gunky and junky across topics. 






Topics, associations, and occurrences can 
all be typed, where the types must be 
defined by the one or more creators of the 
topic map(s). The definitions of allowed 





The Topic Maps Reference Model - 5 
Ontological Commitments
This Standard deliberately leaves undefined 
the methods whereby subject proxies are 
derived or created. No specific mechanism 
of subject identification is inherent in or 
mandated by this Standard, nor does it 
predefine any subject proxies.
NOTE 1 Any subject proxy design choices 
would be specific to a particular application 
domain and would exclude equally valid 
alternatives that might be appropriate 
or necessary in the contexts of various 
requirements.
Two types of relationships, sub (subclass 
of) and isa (instance of), are defined. These 
predicates are always interpreted relative 
to a given map m:
a)  Two proxies c, c0 can be in a 
subclass-superclass relationship, 
subₘ _ m × m. In such a case, the 
same relationship can be stated 
either c is a subclass of c0 or c0 is a 
superclass of c. 
subₘ is supposed to be reflexive 
and transitive. Reflexive implies 
that any proxy is a subclass of itself, 
regardless whether the proxy is used 
as a class in the map or not: x subₘ x 
for all x 2 m.
Transitive implies that if a proxy c 
is a subclass of another, c0, and 
that subclasses c00, then c is also a 
subclass of c00, i.e. if c subₘ c0 and c0 
subₘ c00 then also c subₘ c00 must be 
true.
NOTE 2 Circular subclass 
relationships may exist in a map.
b)  Two proxies a, c can be in an isa 
relationship, isaₘ _ m × m. In such a 
case, the same relationship can be 
stated either a is an instance of c or c 
is the type of a. 
The isa relationship is supposed 
to be non-reflexive, i.e. x isaₘ x for 
no x 2 m, so that no proxy can be 
an instance of itself. Additionally, 
whenever a proxy a is an instance 
of another c, then a is an instance of 
any superclass of c: if x isaₘ c and c 
subₘ c0, then x isaₘ c0 is true.
NOTE 3 This Standard does not mandate 
any particular way of representing such 
relationships inside a map. One option is 
to model such a relationship simply with a 
property using a certain key (say type). An 
alternative way is to provide a proxy for 
each such relationship. Such relationship 
proxies could, for example, have properties 
whose keys are instance and class, or 
respectively subclass and superclass.
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Extract 3 (https://www.isotopicmaps.org/
sam/sam-model/#sect-pubsubj)
7 Core subject identifiers
…
7.2 The type-instance relationship
A topic type is a subject that captures 
some commonality in a set of subjects. 
Any subject that belongs to the extension 
of a particular topic type is known as an 
instance of that topic type. A topic type 
may itself be an instance of another topic 
type, and there is no limit to the number of 
topic types a subject may be an instance of.
The type-instance relationship is not 
transitive. That is, if B is an instance of the 
type A, and C is an instance of the type B, 
it does not follow that C is an instance of A.
…
7.3 The supertype-subtype relationship
The supertype-subtype relationship is the 
relationship between a more general type 
(the supertype) and a specialization of 
that type (the subtype). If B is the subtype 
of A, it follows that every instance of B 
is also an instance of A. The converse is 
not necessarily true. A type may have any 
number of subtypes and supertypes.
The supertype-subtype relationship is 
transitive, which means that if B is a 
subtype of A, and C a subtype of B, C is 
also a subtype of A.
NOTE:
Loops in this relationship are allowed, 
and should be interpreted to mean that 
the sets of instances for all types in 
the loop are the same. This does not, 
however, necessarily imply that the 
types are the same.
NOTE:
The semantics of the supertype-subtype 
relationship implies the existence of 
further type-instance and supertype-
subtype relationships in addition 
to those explicitly represented by 
associations in the topic map. This 
part of ISO/IEC13250 does not require 




Incorporates developments from GFO, 
DOLCE and the Ontology of Universals 




UFO is a well-documented heavyweight 
foundational ontology that have evolved 
over time.
A survey of Top-Level Ontologies A survey of Top-Level Ontologies120 121
E.34 UMBEL
E.34.1 Overview
Is a logically organized knowledge graph of 
34,000 concepts and entity types that can 
be used in information science for relating 
information from disparate sources to one 
another. Since UMBEL is an open-source 
extract of the OpenCyc knowledge base, it 









The Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
is a general-purpose, developmental, 
modeling language in the field of software 
engineering that is intended to provide a 
standard way to visualize the design of a 
system.
The creation of UML was originally 
motivated by the desire to standardize 
the disparate notational systems and 
approaches to software design. It was 
developed by Grady Booch, Ivar Jacobson 
and James Rumbaugh at Rational Software 
in 1994 – 1995, with further development 
led by them through 1996.
In 1997, UML was adopted as a standard by 
the Object Management Group (OMG), and 
has been managed by this organization 
ever since. In 2005, UML was also 
published by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) as an approved 
ISO standard. Since then the standard 
has been periodically revised to cover the 
latest revision of UML.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_
Modeling_Language
See also: http://uml.org/, https://www.iso.
org/standard/32620.html (ISO Standard NB 
v1.4.2)
E.35.2 Top-level
From OMG® Unified Modeling Language® 
(OMG UML®) – Version 2.5.1 (Normative 
URL: https://www.omg.org/spec/UML/)
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E.35.3 Key characteristics
A generic data model with a focus on 
describing computer systems. Supports 
multiple inheritance and classification, 
though as these are typically not feasible 
in programming languages, these are not 
usually used. Typically, first order, though 
limited functionality through generalisation 
sets (powertypes) to move up to higher 
orders (see extract below).
E.35.4 Relevant Extracts
From OMG® Unified Modeling Language® 
(OMG UML®) – Version 2.5.1 (Normative 
URL: https://www.omg.org/spec/UML/)
Extract 1
6.3 On the Semantics of UML
6.3.1 Models and What They Model
A model is always a model of something. 
The thing being modeled can generically be 
considered a system within some domain 
of discourse. The model then makes some 
statements of interest about that system, 
abstracting from all the details of the 
system that could possibly be described, 
from a certain point of view and for a 
certain purpose. For an existing system, 
the model may represent an analysis 
of the properties and behavior of the 
system. For a planned system, the model 
may represent a specification of how the 
system is to be constructed and behave.
A UML model consists of three major 
categories of model elements, each of 
which may be used to make statements 
about different kinds of individual things 
within the system being modeled (termed 
simply “individuals” in the following). These 
categories are:
•  Classifiers. A classifier describes a set 
of objects. An object is an individual 
with a state and relationships to 
other objects. The state of an object 
identifies the values for that object 
of properties of the classifier of the 
object. (In some cases, a classifier itself 
may also be considered an individual; 
for example, see the discussion of 
static structural features in sub clause 
9.4.3.)
•  Events. An event describes a set of 
possible occurrences. An occurrence 
is something that happens that has 
some consequence with regard to the 
system.
•  Behaviors. A behavior describes a set 
of possible executions. An execution 
is a performance of a set of actions 
(potentially over some period of time) 
that may generate and respond to 
occurrences of events, including 
accessing and changing the state 
of objects. (As described in sub 
clause 13.2, behaviors are themselves 
modeled in UML as kinds of classifiers, 
so that executions are essentially 
modeled as objects. However, for the 
purposes of the present discussion, 
it is clearer to consider behaviors 
and executions to be in a separate 





GeneralizationSet provides a way to 
group Generalizations into orthogonal 
dimensions. A GeneralizationSet may 
be associated with a Classifier called its 
powertype. These techniques provide 




Generalizations may be grouped to 
represent orthogonal dimensions 
of generalization. Each group is 
represented by a GeneralizationSet. 
The generalizationSet property 
designates the GeneralizationSets to 
which the Generalization belongs. All 
of the Generalizations in a particular 
GeneralizationSet shall have the same 
general Classifier.
The isCovering property of 
GeneralizationSet specifies whether the 
specific Classifiers of the Generalizations 
in that set are complete, in the following 
sense: if isCovering is true, then every 
instance of the general Classifier is an 
instance of (at least) one of the specific 
Classifiers. The isDisjoint property specifies 
whether the specific Classifiers of the 
Generalizations in that set may overlap, 
in the following sense: if isDisjoint is true, 
then no instance of any of the specific 
Classifiers may also be an instance of any 
other of the specific Classifiers. By default, 
both properties are false.
A GeneralizationSet may optionally be 
associated with a Classifier called its 
powertype. This means that for every 
Generalization in the GeneralizationSet, 
the specializing Classifier is uniquely 
associated with an instance of 
the powertype, i.e., there is a 1-1 
correspondence between instances of 
the powertype and specializations in the 
GeneralizationSet, so that the powertype 
instances and the corresponding 
Classifiers may be treated as semantically 
equivalent. How this semantic equivalence 
is implemented and how its integrity is 
maintained is not defined within the scope 
of UML.
E.36 UMLS – Unified Medical 
Language System
E.36.1 Overview
The Unified Medical Language System 
(UMLS) is a compendium of many 
controlled vocabularies in the biomedical 
sciences (created 1986). It provides 
a mapping structure among these 
vocabularies and thus allows one to 
translate among the various terminology 
systems; it may also be viewed as a 
comprehensive thesaurus and ontology 
of biomedical concepts. UMLS further 
provides facilities for natural language 
processing. It is intended to be used mainly 
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E.36.3 Key characteristics




The Semantic Network consists of (1) 
a set of broad subject categories, or 
Semantic Types, that provide a consistent 
categorization of all concepts represented 
in the UMLS Metathesaurus, and (2) a set 
of useful and important relationships, or 
Semantic Relations, that exist between 
Semantic Types. This section of the 
documentation provides an overview of the 
Semantic Network, and describes the files 
of the Semantic Network. Sample records 




WordNet is a lexical database of semantic 
relations between words in more than 
200 languages. WordNet links words into 
semantic relations including synonyms, 
hyponyms, and meronyms. The synonyms 
are grouped into synsets with short 
definitions and usage examples. WordNet 
can thus be seen as a combination and 







A natural language ontology.
E.37.4 Relevant extracts
From: What is WordNet? (https://wordnet.
princeton.edu/)
Extract 1 – Type-instance distinction
WordNet distinguishes among Types 
(common nouns) and Instances (specific 
persons, countries and geographic 
entities). Thus, armchair is a type of chair, 
Barack Obama is an instance of a president. 
Instances are always leaf (terminal) nodes 
in their hierarchies.
E.38 YAMATO – Yet Another More 
Advanced Top-level Ontology
E.38.1 Overview
YAMATO is developed by Riichiro Mizoguchi, 
formerly at the Institute of Scientific and 
Industrial Research of the University of 
Osaka, and now at the Japan Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology. Major 
features of YAMATO are:
1.  an advanced description of quality, 
attribute, property, and quantity,
2.  an ontology of representation,
3.  an advanced description of processes 
and events,
4.  the use of a theory of roles.
YAMATO has been extensively used for 
developing other, more applied, ontologies 
such as a medical ontology, an ontology of 
gene, an ontology of learning/instructional 
theories, an ontology of sustainability 
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E.38.3 Key characteristics
This is a first order ontology - vide the top 
object called ‘Particular’. For the endurant 
horizontal aspect it separates occurrents 
and continuants - vide continuant-
occurrent division of physical.
E.38.4 Relevant extracts
From: Mizoguchi, R. (2010). YAMATO: Yet 
another more advanced top-level ontology. 
In Proceedings of the sixth Australasian 
ontology workshop (pp. 1-16).
Extract 1 – Strict single inheritance
It adopts strict single inheritance in is-a 
hierarchy which is organized according to 
the rigid definition of is-a and instance-of 
relations based on the set membership 
with the notion of essential property.
Extract 2 – Genuine multiple inheritance
For the cases where genuine multiple 
inheritance is necessary, Hozo prepares 
IS-A relation which is nothing to do with 
identity problem of instances but only 
with property inheritance like subclassof 
relation in OWL. It may be used only when 
is-a relation already exists between the 
two types of interest.
Appendix F 
Prior ontological commitment 
literature
Year Reference
2002 Partridge, C. (2002). “Note: A couple of meta-ontological choices for ontological 
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http://www.thezfiles.co.za/ROMULUS/ontologicalCommitments.html
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and explanation.” In International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and 
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2013 Partridge, C., Mitchell, A. & de Cesare, S. (2013). “Guidelines for developing 
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Metaphysical Choices.” In Sebastian Link and Juan Carlos Trujillo (Ed.), Advances in 
Conceptual Modeling: ER 2016 Workshops, AHA, MoBiD, MORE-BI, MReBA, QMMQ, 
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Appendix G 
Criteria for a good scientific 
theory
Thomas Kuhn studied the 
characteristics of successful 
improvements in scientific theories, 
uncovering this list of six features 
(reported in Objectivity, value 
judgment, and theory choice – 
reference below):
•  Generality: where the scope of the 
improved theory increased.
•  Simplicity: where the improved theory 
is less complicated (it is typically more 
‘deeply simple’ in the complexity theory 
sense).
•  Explanatory power: the ability of the 
improved theory to give in-creased 
meaning.
•  Fruitfulness: the ability of the improved 
theory to meet currently un-specified 
requirements or to be easily extendable 
to do so.
•  Objectivity: the ability of the improved 
theory to provide a more objective 
(shared) understanding of the world.
•  Precision: the ability of the improved 
theory to give a more precise picture of 
the world.
Making the ontological choices explicit 
provides an opportunity to take a position 
that improves on a number of features; 
explanatory power and objectivity are 
obvious candidates.
References
Kuhn, T. (1977) “Objectivity, value 
judgment, and theory choice”. In: The 
Essential Tension: Selected Studies in 
Scientific Tradition and Change. University 
of Chicago Press, pp 320-339
Noted as useful for assessing ontologies in, 
for example:
Partridge, C. (2004). “Setting the Scene: 42 
Objects Business Ontology Based Software 
Development.” In Philosophy, Ontology, 
and Information Systems, colocated with 
ECOOP 2004. Oslo, Norway. Retrieved from 
https://www.academia.edu/30180313/
Partridge, C., Mitchell, A. & de Cesare, 
S. (2013). “Guidelines for developing 
ontological architectures in modelling and 
simulation.” In Ontology, Epistemology, and 
Teleology for Modeling and Simulation (pp. 
27–57). Springer. Retrieved from https://
www.academia.edu/32864750/
Appendix H 
Detailed notes on 3.2.1 Basis
H.1 Simplicity
The virtues of simplicity have been 
recognised since Aristotle (“We may 
assume the superiority ceteris paribus 
of the demonstration which derives from 
fewer postulates or hypotheses” – Posterior 
Analytics) to Einstein (It can scarcely 
be denied that the supreme goal of all 
theory is to make the irreducible basic 
elements as simple and as few as possible 
without having to surrender the adequate 
representation of a single datum of 
experience).
David Lewis describes the distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative 
parsimony in Counterfactuals and 
voiced his support for just qualitative 
parsimony: I subscribe to the general view 
that qualitative parsimony is good in a 
philosophical or empirical hypothesis; but 
I recognize no presumption whatever in 
favor of quantitative parsimony.
The restriction of Ockham’s razor to just 
fundamental entities is promoted by 
(Cameron, 2010), (Schaffer, 2010), and 
(Sider, 2013). (Schaffer, 2015, p. 647) dubs 
this version "The Laser" and formulates it 
as an injunction not to multiply fundamental 
entities beyond necessity, together with 
the implicit understanding that there is 
no such injunction against multiplying 
derivative entities.
H.2 Explanatory sufficiency
The principle has its origin in the same 
medieval controversies that spawned 
Occam's Razor. Ockham's contemporary, 
Walter of Chatton, proposed that: [I]f 
three things are not enough to verify an 
affirmative proposition about things, a 
fourth must be added, and so on. A related 
counter-principle was later defended by 
Kant: The variety of entities should not be 
rashly diminished (The Critique of Pure 
Reason).
[T]he grand aim of all science…is to 
cover the greatest possible number of 
empirical facts by logical deductions 
from the smallest possible number of 
hypotheses or axioms (Einstein, quoted 
in (Nash, 1963, p. 173)).
Einstein’s quote above respects the 
principle, when he says, “without having to 
surrender the adequate representation”.
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Ontological commitments – 
technical details
In this appendix, we cover a range 
of the relevant background detailed 
technical issues. We also include 
relevant extracts at the end, as a 
gateway to the wider literature on this 
topic.
I.1  Natural language ontology – 
foundational ontology
One use of ontology is to describe the 
language (and associated concepts) we 
use to talk about things – hence a natural 
language ontology. Friederike Moltmann 
gives a good outline of this in the extract 
below; noting, for example, that it “is better 
to be characterized as the ontology that 
a speaker implicitly accepts when using 
the language” and so “may include merely 
conceived objects besides objects that 
happen to be actual ones.”
She also contrasts this with “the ontology 
of what there really is” which she, following 
Fine (2017), calls ‘foundational ontology’. 
There, Fine contrasts foundational ontology 
with what he calls naïve ontology. As 
Moltmann points out (see extract below 
I.1.1), “Fine’s (2017) term ‘naïve metaphysics’ 
thus is misleading” – natural language or 
descriptive ontology is a better description. 
Fine (2017) also suggests that “naive 
metaphysics will be the metaphysics 
of appearance while foundational 
metaphysics will be the metaphysics of 
reality, with the one concerned to discern 
the nature of the world as it presents itself 
to us and the other concerned to discern 
the nature of the world as it is in itself.”
Note, in earlier ontological commitment 
analyses (Borgo (2002), Semy (2004) – 
extracts below – and Orbst (2010)) there 
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is a similar distinction between descriptive 
and revisionary ontologies (based upon 
Strawson’s (1959) distinction). This 
nomenclature then evolved to descriptive 
and realist ontologies in ROMULUS (2013). 
However, as you can see from the extracts, 
this distinction was often expanded to 
cover with linked distinctions such as 
between space and time and space-time, 
and endurants and perdurants.
I.1.1  Friederike Moltmann – Natural 
Language Ontology
Extract from: Friederike Moltmann (2020) 
Chapter 13 – Abstract Objects and 
the Core-Periphery Distinction in the 
Ontological and the Conceptual Domain 
of Natural Language. Online: https://www.
academia.edu/38640396/
13.3 Natural Language Ontology
The following is a brief outline of the 
discipline whose subject matter is the 
ontology of natural language, natural 
language ontology. With its referential 
noun phrases, which take entities as 
semantic values as well as with its lexical 
predicates and constructions that involve 
entities in other ways, natural language 
reflects an ontology. This ontology is the 
subject matter of a particular branch of 
metaphysics, that of natural language 
ontology. More specifically, natural 
language ontology is part of descriptive 
metaphysics in Strawson’s (1959) sense or 
what Fine (2017) calls ‘naïve metaphysics’. 
Descriptive metaphysics has as its 
subject matter the ontology reflected in 
our ordinary judgments. Natural language 
ontology has as its subject matter the 
ontology reflected in linguistic intuitions, 
that is, judgments about the acceptability 
or grammaticality of natural language 
sentences and constructions.
What is important about descriptive 
metaphysics is that it is not about the 
ontology of what there really is. This is 
instead the subject matter of a different 
branch of metaphysics, what Fine calls 
‘foundational metaphysics’.[4] Descriptive 
metaphysics and natural language ontology 
in particular concerns itself with how 
things appear, given the data, without 
addressing the question of whether they 
are real (which is to be addressed only 
by foundational metaphysics). For natural 
language ontology; this means that no 
foundationalist consideration should 
come into play when positing objects as 
semantic values, such as assumptions as 
to whether those objects really exist (in 
the sense of being fundamental) or what 
they may be reduced to. More important is 
what sorts properties the semantic values 
of referential noun phrases may have, as 
is reflected (at least to an extent) in the 
applicability of types of natural language 
predicates. The domain of objects in the 
ontology of natural language thus may 
include merely conceived objects besides 
objects that happen to be actual ones. 
(This will also be important for how to 
make sense of the expandability of the 
ontological domain of the language through 
technical or philosophical discourse in Sect. 
13.4.)
The subject matter of natural language 
ontology is not the ontology that ordinary 
speakers (non-philosophers) naively 
accept when thinking about what there 
is. [5] The latter is the subject matter of 
folk metaphysics, not natural language 
ontology. What speakers accept when they 
reflect does not matter for natural language 
ontology. Natural language ontology rather 
deals with the ontological categories, 
notions, and structures that are implicit 
in language whether or not speakers 
would accept them upon reflection. The 
ontology of natural language thus is better 
to be characterized as the ontology that a 
speaker implicitly accepts when using the 
language and as such is distinguished from 
both the reflective ontology of ordinary 
speakers as well as philosophers and the 
ontology of what there really is (Moltmann 
2017, 2019).
[4] For Strawson (1959), descriptive 
metaphysics rather contrasts with what he 
calls ‘revisionary metaphysics’. The aim of 
revisionary metaphysics, for Strawson, is to 
conceive of a better ontology than the one 
we ordinarily accept. (Strawson does not 
specify further how ‘better’ is supposed to 
be understood.)
[5] Fine’s (2017) term ‘naïve metaphysics’ 
thus is misleading, and ‘descriptive 
metaphysics’ a better term to use for the 
branch of metaphysics that comprises 
natural language ontology.
I.1.2  Wonderweb deliverable d15: 
Ontology Roadmap (2002)
2 Design Options and Ontological Choices
Before addressing specific issues about 
domain of discourse, basic categories, 
and their relations [4], it may be important 
to clarify the general attitude towards 
ontological analysis, or – in other words – 
the motivations and the constraints that 
drive our conceptualization of reality. It 
comes to no surprise that the design 
options for building foundational ontologies 
reflect the main categorical distinctions 
discussed in philosophy. However, 
among all the philosophical stances and 
distinctions, foundational ontologists 
seem particularly interested in two general 
attitudes: a) descriptive vs. revisionary, and 
b) multiplicative vs. reductionist.
(a) A descriptive ontology aims at capturing 
the ontological stances that shape 
natural language and human cognition. 
It is based on the assumption that the 
surface structure of natural language 
and the so-called commonsense have 
ontological relevance. As a consequence, 
the categories refer to cognitive artifacts 
more or less depending on human 
perception, cultural imprints and social 
conventions. Under this approach, there 
are no major restrictions on the postulation 
of ontological categories because overall 
philosophical or scientific paradigms are 
neglected. This attitude stands in contrast 
to the revisionary approach. The revisionist 
considers linguistic and cognitive issues 
at the level of secondary sources (if 
considered at all), and does not hesitate to 
paraphrase linguistic expressions (or to re-
interpret cognitive phenomena) when their 
ontological assumptions are not defensible 
on scientific grounds. The following 
example should make this contraposition 
clear. Commonsense distinguishes 
between things (spatial objects like houses 
and computers) and events (temporal 
objects like bank transfers and computer 
repairs). In the wake of relativity theory, 
how- ever, time is viewed as another 
dimension of objects on a par with the 
traditional spatial dimensions. Considering 
the consequences of this scientific theory 
(or theories), some philosophers and 
computer scientists have come to believe 
that the commonsense distinction between 
things that are and things that happen 
should be abandoned in favor of a unified 
viewpoint. According to these revisionist 
researchers, everything extends in space 
and time, and the distinction between 
things and events is an (ontologically 
irrelevant) historical and cognitive accident. 
This example shows that a revisionary 
ontology is committed to capture the 
intrinsic nature of the world by providing 
structures that are independent from the 
conceptualizing agents.
[4] A. Gangemi, N. Guarino, C. Masolo, 
and A. Oltramari. Understanding top-
level ontological distinctions. In IJCAI-01 
Workshop on Ontologies and Information 
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I.1.3  MITRE: Toward the Use of an Upper 
Ontology for U.S. Government and 
U.S. Military Domains (2004)
3.2.1 Descriptive vs. Revisionary
Descriptive and revisionary ontologies 
[67], [49] are based on ontological 
stances or attitudes towards the effort 
of modeling ontologies, i.e., how one 
conceptualizes the world and what an 
ontological engineering product is or 
should be. A descriptive ontology tries 
to capture the more commonsensical 
and social notions based on natural 
language usage and human cognition, 
emphasizing the agent who conceives and 
deemphasizing scientific and philosophical 
considerations. A revisionary (sometimes 
called prescriptive) ontology, on the 
other hand, does emphasize (or even, 
strictly adheres to) the scientific and 
philosophical perspectives, choosing to 
base its constructs and modeling decisions 
on scientific theories and a philosophical 
stance that tries to capture the world as 
it really is (it prescribes the world), and 
not necessarily as a given historical agent 
conceives it to be. A revisionary ontology 
therefore says that its modeling constructs 
are about real things in the world as it is.
In practical terms, all of the constructs in 
a revisionary ontology will be space-time 
objects, i.e., necessarily having temporal 
properties; in a descriptive ontology, 
that will not be the case. In the latter, 
entities (sometimes called endurants, 
but perhaps better called continuants) 
such as “hammer” and “tank” that have 
only incidental temporal properties and 
events (processes, actions, activities, 
etc., sometimes called perdurants, but 
perhaps better called occurrents) such as 
“attacking” and “cashing a check” that have 
explicit temporal properties, are modeled 
with or without those temporal properties, 
respectively. Often in natural language 
there are two correlated forms/usages 
that express the distinction: the nominal 
and the verbal. A nominal (noun) “attack” 
is expressed as in “The attack on the 
enemy began at 600 hours.” A verbal (verb) 
“attacked” is expressed as in “We attacked 
the enemy at 600 hours.”
[67] Strawson, P.F. 1959. Individuals: An 
Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: 
Methuan University Press.
[49] Obrst, L., H. Liu, R. Wray. 2003. 
Ontologies for Corporate Web Applications. 
Artificial Intelligence Magazine, special 
issue on Ontologies, American Association 
for Artificial Intelligence, Chris Welty, ed., 
Fall, 2003, pp. 49-62.
I.2   Extensional and intensional 
criteria of identity
I.2.1 Making a single broad choice
Typically, top-level ontologies will adopt 
one of these broad choices for their main 
entities, though they may adopt the 
alternative for selected entities.
Typically, ontologies with an extensional 
strategy pick very general groups as the 
bearers of criteria of identity. BORO, ISO 
15926, HQDM and IDEAS are examples 
of this. They include types/sets with an 
extensional membership criterion and 
particulars with a spatio-temporal parts 
criterion (often simplified to spatio-
temporal extension).
Typically, ontologies with an intensional 
strategy pick less general, more specific 
groups, often known as sortals, as the 
bearers of criteria of identity, as the 
essential characteristics that inform the 
object’s identity are less general. BFO, 
DOLCE and UFO are examples of this.
I.2.2 Bearers of specific identity criteria
Often entities are labelled with their 
identity choice; so extensional entities 
and intensional entities. As the examples 
above show, for various reasons (including 
pragmatism) these choices are not made 
for each individual entity, rather they are 
made for groups of entities, where the 
choice applies to all members of the group. 
Often the entities are grouped by their 
specific identity criteria, where different 
groups have different criteria – the groups 
bear these identity conditions. Normally 
these groups are disjoint, as otherwise 
there is a requirement for meta-rules to 
arbitrate for objects that fall under two 
different criteria of identity (Guarino 
(2000) offers this meta-rule: Properties 
carrying incompatible Identity Criteria are 
necessarily disjoint).
I.2.3 Taming intensional promiscuity
We can illustrate the core difference 
between the two ways of capturing identity 
with an example – showing the potential 
promiscuity of the intensional approach. 
As already noted, general objects have 
an extension; the objects that instantiate 
the object. Under extensional criteria, this 
extension determines its identity. Under 
intensional criteria, it does not. Consider 
the earlier example of an equilateral 
triangle – defined as having equal sides. 
Now consider equiangular triangles – with 
three equal angles. One can prove that 
these definitions are equivalent. However, 
they are different, so it makes sense to 
say they are different intensions, even 
though one can logically show they 
always have the same extension. One can 
easily develop more and more baroque 
definitions that have this same extension. 
Under a permissive intensional strategy, 
these would all be different objects. One 
is then faced with deciding what counts 
as a different meaning. As far as we 
have been able to determine, in so far as 
the candidate top-level ontologies have 
adopted an intensional strategy, they have 
adopted a permissive one.
I.2.4  Extensionality as varieties of 
formal grounding
One can view extensional identity as a form 
of grounding. In the case of a set, the set is 
composed of and grounded and dependent 
upon its members and their identity. In the 
case of material objects, one could argue 
that they are composed of and grounded 
and dependent upon their parts (and their 
identity). The identity of the extensional 
object is grounded in the formal collection 
of the identities of the grounding objects.
In both cases, the composing and so 
grounding is simpliciter. Tuples – ordered 
lists of objects – where the order is 
important, and repetition is allowed – show 
this is not always the case. For example, 
<a, b, a> is a valid tuple where ‘a’ is a 
component twice. The tuple <b, a, b> has 
the same base components, a and b, but 
different orders (and repetitions) of them. 
In this case, the formal extension (and so 
criteria of identity) needs to recognise both 
order and repetition. (For more detail see 
Partridge (2019))
I.2.5  A solid basis for two types of 
extensional identity emerges
Two development have changed the 
capability of extension to capture identity.
The first related to the extension of 
material objects. René Descartes, in 
Principia Philosophiæ (1644), introduced 
the notion of material objects as res 
extensa – as extended in space. This 
notion took hold. For example, John 
Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690), defined extension 
as "only the Space that lies between 
the Extremities of those solid coherent 
Parts" of a body. However, this raised 
questions about compenetration, where 
to two or more extensions occupying the 
same space at the same time – a problem 
raised by the Ancient Greeks. In the early 
20th century, physicists developed a new 
way to think about extension, as space-
time. Philosophers developed this as a 
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more solid basis for identity. At one time, 
two things might be in the same place 
but not at a later time, having different 
spatio-temporal extensions. One could 
accommodate both (spatial) compresence 
and identity.
The second related to the extension of 
general entities. It was normal, until the 
middle of the 20th century to regard the 
extension of general terms to be the actual 
objects that fell under the term. Work done 
by Kripke and then Lewis (see (Yagisawa, 
2005)) on possible worlds provided an 
extensional way of capturing modal 
intensions (the extensions over possible 
worlds were sometimes called ‘intentions’) 
and so tracking identity.
These two developments provided a solid 
basis for extensional identity.
I.2.6  BFO example of universals’ non-
extensional (intensional) identity 
criteria
We have not been able to find any specific 
mention of identity criteria in the BFO 
manuals. However, the extract below (from 
the BFO manual) even though it does not 
mention identity criteria directly shows that 
it distinguishes between the universal and 
its extension in an intensional way.
“2.6 Universals and classes
Universals have instances, which in BFO 
are in every case particulars (entities 
located in specific regions of space and 
time). Universals also have extensions, 
which we can think of as collections 
of their instances. (Traditionally the 
extension of a concept is viewed is 
set-theoretical terms as the set of all 
the things that fall under the concept.) 
Such extensions fall outside the scope 
of this specification, but it is important 
for the understanding of BFO that the 
distinction is recognized. It implies 
further distinctions not only between 
universals and their extensions but 
also between universals and classes in 
general, including arbitrary classes such 
as: {the moon, Napoleon, redness}.”
Basic Formal Ontology 2.0: SPECIFICATION 
AND USER’S GUIDE 
June 26, 2015
I.2.7  OntoClean discussion of 
Intensional Identity
Other ontologies address the question of 
intensional identity directly. The extract 
below is from the Wikipedia entry for 
OntoClean (“OntoClean – Identity,” n.d.) – a 
tool developed by the creators of DOLCE. 
This clearly talks about intentional criteria 
of identity – saying:
“Identity criteria should be informative, 
they should help us and others 
understand what a class means.” It also 
offers two possible criteria for a triangle: 
it “… can be identified by the length of 
its three sides, or by two sides and an 
interior angle, etc. This says a lot about 
what is intended by the triangle class 
here, e.g. the same triangle could be 
in many places at the same time.” It 
seems to be relaxed that these are 
different objects as they have different 
definitions.
Identity
Identity is fundamental to ontology, 
and especially to information systems 
ontologies. Identity is well known 
in metaphysics and in database 
conceptual modeling. In the latter case, 
it is an accepted best practice to specify 
a primary key for rows in a table. If "two" 
rows have identical primary keys, they 
are considered the same row.
More importantly for ontology are 
questions of identity that expose the 
existence of, or at least the need to 
represent, other entities. Here the issue 
at stake is finding the conditions under 
which a proposed entity would be both 
the same and different. The classic 
example is an amount of clay that is 
shaped into a statue. If you use the 
same clay but reshape it into a different 
statue, is it the same entity? If so, how 
could it be different? If not, how could 
it be the same. In conceptual modeling, 
it is understood that when such an 
ambiguity arises, one should treat it as 
two different entities to account for a 
situation where one changes and the 
other stays the same.
In OntoClean, identity criteria are 
associated with, or carried by, some 
classes of entities, called sortals. A 
sortal is a class all of whose instances 
are identified in the same way. In 
information systems, these criteria are 
often extrinsic, like a social security 
number or universally unique id, which 
is not interesting from an ontological 
point of view. Identity criteria should be 
informative, they should help us and 
others understand what a class means. 
A triangle, for example, can be identified 
by the length of its three sides, or by 
two sides and an interior angle, etc. This 
says a lot about what is intended by 
the triangle class here, e.g. the same 
triangle could be in many places at the 
same time. Someone else may have 
an ontology in which the triangle class 
has different identity criteria, such that 
different drawings are always different 
triangles, even if they are the same size. 
Identity criteria (and OntoClean, for that 
matter) do not tell you that one of these 
definitions of triangle is right or wrong, 
just that they are different and thus that 
the classes are different.
Identity criteria and sortals are intuitively 
meant to account for the linguistic habit 
of associating identity with certain 
classes. In the classical statue and clay 
example, we naturally say "the same 
clay" or "the same statue", indicating 
that there are identity criteria that are 
peculiar to each class.
Being a sortal is the first OntoClean 
metaproperty, indicated with the +I 
superscript (-I for non-sortals) on a 
class in the original notation. +I (but 
not -I) is inherited down the class 
hierarchy, if a class is a sortal then all its 
subclasses are as well.
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I.3 Indexicality
In (Galton, 2018, pp. 37–8): "3.3. 
Indexicality: Past, Present, and Future: 
Should an ontology of time include 
reference to the present moment? As 
noted above, if ‘right now’ is seriously 
proposed, as in [1], as an example of a 
zero-dimensional temporal region, then 
the implicit answer is that it should. … If 
this is right, then it would be reasonable 
for a formal ontology that claims to provide 
an account of objective reality to include 
pastness, presentness, and futurity as 
attributes of times, though it is hard to 
see how to integrate this into the overall 
temporal framework, and as far as I am 
aware none of the currently existing formal 
upper ontologies has attempted to do this. 
Until such time as this is done, it would be 
best to steer clear of problematic entities 
such as ‘right now’ as examples of instants.”
As I noted above and Galton does here, 
having a separatist spatial structure 
provides a good starting point for 
identifying the present.
While Galton is right that many top-
level ontologies do not have a way of 
representing the present, he is not right 
in that they all do not. There are top-
level ontologies that include indexicality 
– BORO is an example. See Partridge, 1996: 
Business objects: re-engineering for re-use. 
Chapter 8 – Section – 4 – The time-based 
‘consciousness’ of information systems – 
which discusses a ‘now’ and ‘here’ object. 
In a later paper (Partridge, 2018), a more 
sophisticated way of handling indexicality 
using agentology is described. This has 




co.uk. The paper suggests that there is 
an agentology layer indexed to the agent/




formal ontology The term formal ontology; itself was coined by Edmund Husserl in the second 
edition of his Logical Investigations (1900-01), where it refers to an ontological 
counterpart of formal logic. Formal ontology for Husserl embraces an axiomatized 
mereology and a theory of dependence relations, for example between the 
qualities of an object and the object itself. Formal; signifies not the use of a formal-
logical language, but rather: non-material, or in other words domain-independent 
(of universal application).”
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ontology#Historical_background
ontology Jonathon Lowe in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy described ontology 









A model of an ontology. An ontology can have multiple models.
ontological 
architecture
The fundamental structures of the ontology. Typically includes the major choices 
of ontological commitment. Can function as a blueprint for developing an ontology.
A survey of Top-Level Ontologies A survey of Top-Level Ontologies140 141
References
Ainsworth, T. (2020). “Form vs. Matter.” In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2020). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter
Cameron, R. P. (2010). “How to have a radically minimal ontology.” Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 
249–264.
Casati, R. & Varzi, A. C. (1999). Parts and places: The structures of spatial representation. MIT 
Press.
Galton, A. (2018). “The Treatment of Time in Upper Ontologies.” In FOIS (pp. 33–46). Retrieved 
from http://ebooks.iospress.nl/publication/50243
Gilmore, C., Costa, D. & Calosi, C. (2016). “Relativity and three four-dimensionalisms.” 
Philosophy Compass, 11(2), 102–120. Retrieved from https://philpapers.org/rec/GILRAT-10
Hetherington, J. & West, M. (2020). “The pathway towards an Information Management 
Framework-A ‘Commons’ for Digital Built Britain.”
ISO. (2019). “Information technology – Top-Level Ontologies (TLO) – Part1: Requirements.”
Kant, I. (1964). Critique of pure reason (p. 483, 1 l.). London, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.: J. M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd.;
Locke, J. (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (p. 867). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lowe, E. J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Nash, L. K. (1963). “The nature of the natural sciences.”
“OntoClean – Identity.” (n.d.). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OntoClean#Identity
Partridge, C. (1996). Business objects: re-engineering for re-use. Butterworth-Heinemann.
Partridge, C., de Cesare, S., Mitchell, A., Gailly, F. & Khan, M. (2017). “Developing an Ontological 
Sandbox: Investigating Multi-Level Modelling’s Possible Metaphysical Structures.” Retrieved 
from https://www.academia.edu/35222673
Partridge, C., de Cesare, S., Mitchell, A., Leon, A., Gailly, F. & Khan, M. (2018). “Ontology then 
Agentology: A Finer Grained Framework for Enterprise Modelling.” In Proceedings of the 6th 
International Conference on Model-Driven Engineering and Software Development (MODELSWARD 
2018) (pp. 454–463). Funchal, Madeira, Portugal: SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology 
Publications. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/35335427
Partridge, C., de Cesare, S., Mitchell, A. & Odell, J. (2016). “Formalization of the classification pattern: 
survey of classification modeling in information systems engineering.” Software & Systems 
Modeling, 1–37. Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10270-016-0521-5
Partridge, C., Mitchell, A., Loneragan, M., Atkinson, H., de Cesare, S. & Khan, M. (2019). “Coordinate 
Systems: Level Ascending Ontological Options.” In 2019 ACM/IEEE 22nd International Conference 
on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems Companion (MODELS-C) (pp. 78–87). 
Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/40354620
Schaffer, J. (2010). “Monism: The priority of the whole.” Philosophical Review, 119(1), 31–76.
Schaffer, J. (2015). “What not to multiply without necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), 
644–664.
Sider, T. (2013). “Against parthood.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 8(2013), 237–293.
Strachey, C. (2000). “Fundamental concepts in programming languages.” Higher-Order and Symbolic 
Computation, 13(1-2), 11–49.
Varzi, A. (2019). “Mereology.” In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2019). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved from https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/mereology
Yagisawa, T. (2005). “Possible Objects.” In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/possible-objects/

























The National Digital Twin programme is funded by the University of Cambridge and the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy via InnovateUK, part of UK Research 
& Innovation. This paper was also supported by the Construction Innovation Hub with funding 
provided through the Government’s modern industrial strategy by Innovate UK, part of UK 
Research & Innovation.
